The Impact of the 2013 CAP Reform on the Decoupled Payments' Capitalization into Land Values by CIAIAN PAVEL et al.
  
 
 
Pavel Ciaian, d'Artis Kancs,  
Maria Espinosa 
 
The Impact of the 2013 CAP Reform 
on the Decoupled Payments' 
Capitalization into Land Values  
2016  
EUR 27940 EN 
 
 
 
  
  
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in-house science service. It aims to provide 
evidence-based scientific support to the European policy-making process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of 
the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use 
which might be made of this publication. 
 
Contact information 
Pavel Ciaian 
Address: Edificio Expo. c/ Inca Garcilaso, 3. E-41092 Seville (Spain) 
E-mail: pavel.ciaian@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +34 95 448 8429 
Fax: +34 95 448 8300 
 
JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC101619 
 
EUR 27940 EN 
 
 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-58541-8 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2791/698744 
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 
 
 
© European Union, 2016 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
 
 
How to cite: Ciaian, P., D. Kancs and M. Espinosa (2016). The Impact of the 2013 CAP Reform on the Decoupled Payments' Capitalization 
into Land Values. EUR 27940 EN, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, doi:10.2791/698744 
 
 
All images © European Union 2016 
  
 
Table of contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 6 
2. Agricultural land markets in the European Union ................................................................................. 8 
3. Decoupled payments in the EU ............................................................................................................. 10 
3.1. Pre-reform decoupled payments ........................................................................................................... 10 
3.2. The 2013 CAP reform ........................................................................................................................... 11 
4. Pre-reform capitalization: Insights from the literature ........................................................................ 13 
4.1. Previous conceptual studies on the SPS ............................................................................................... 13 
4.2. Empirical evidence ............................................................................................................................... 15 
5. Impact of the 2013 CAP reform ............................................................................................................ 17 
5.1. Conceptual framework .......................................................................................................................... 17 
5.2. Budget change and external convergence of payments (Reform I) ....................................................... 18 
5.3. Internal convergence of payments (Reform II) ..................................................................................... 20 
5.4. Differentiation of payments between farms (Reform III) ...................................................................... 22 
5.5. Entitlement allocation (Reform IV) ....................................................................................................... 22 
5.6. 'Greening' of the CAP (Reform V) ........................................................................................................ 24 
6. Estimation of the capitalization effects of the reform ........................................................................... 26 
6.1. Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 26 
6.2. Data and variable construction ............................................................................................................ 28 
6.3. Results ................................................................................................................................................... 31 
7. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 36 
8. References ............................................................................................................................................. 38 
 
  
  
 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1. Development in land prices in EU (EUR/ha) ........................................................... 43 
Figure 2. The effect of the SPS harmonization between MS ................................................... 44 
Figure 3. The effect of the SPS with surplus and deficit entitlements ..................................... 45 
Figure 4. The effect of the reference period ............................................................................ 46 
Figure 5. The effect of CAP 'greening' .................................................................................... 47 
Figure 6. Estimated decoupled payments capitalization rates in NMS, OMS and EU ............ 48 
Figure 7. Sources of the 2013 CAP reform capitalization in NMS, OMS and EU ................. 48 
Figure 8. Non-farming land owners' gains from the decoupled payments in NMS, OMS and 
EU ............................................................................................................................................ 49 
 
  
  
 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 1. Agricultural land sales as a percentage of the total utilized agricultural area ............ 50 
Table 2. Land renting in the European Union.......................................................................... 51 
Table 3. Rental prices in the European Union (EUR/ha) ......................................................... 52 
Table 4. SPS activated area in 2013......................................................................................... 53 
Table 5. Empirical evidence of decoupled payment capitalization into land values ............... 54 
Table 6. The CAP budget before and after the reform (million Euros and Index) .................. 55 
Table 7. The implementation of decoupled payments by Member State ................................ 56 
Table 8. Data used for the capitalization quantifications ......................................................... 57 
Table 9. Expected impact of the 2013 CAP reform on decoupled payments capitalization ... 58 
Table 10. Sources of the 2013 CAP reform capitalization ...................................................... 59 
Table 11. Land renting, and non-farming land owners' gains from the decoupled payments . 60 
 
 
 5 
 
  
List of abbreviations 
 
ANC  Areas of Natural Constraints 
BPS  Basic Payment Scheme 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy  
CATS Clearance of Accounts Audit Trail System 
DCNDP Decoupled Complementary National Direct Payments 
DG-AGRI Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development 
EFA  Ecological Focus Area 
EU European Union 
FADN Farm Accountancy Data Network 
FSS  Farm Structure Survey 
GAEC Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition 
MS  Member States 
NMS  New Member States 
OECD  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OMS Old Member States 
RDP  Rural Development Programme 
SAPS Single Area Payment System 
SMR Statutory Management Requirements 
SPS Single Payment Scheme 
UAA Utilized Agriculture Area 
UK United Kingdom 
 
 6 
 
The Impact of the 2013 CAP Reform on the Decoupled Payments' 
Capitalization into Land Values
1
 
 
Pavel Ciaian, d'Artis Kancs, Maria Espinosa  
 
DG Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
 
 
Abstract  
Decoupled direct payments were introduced in the European Union (EU) by the 2003 CAP reform in form of 
the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) and the Single Area Payment System (SAPS). The 2013 CAP reform 
changed both the implementation of decoupled payments as well as its budget. We assess the possible effects of 
the 2013 CAP reform on the capitalization of decoupled payments in land rental values. Our estimates suggest 
that the CAP reform leads to an increase in the capitalization of decoupled payments by additional 16 cents for 
each EUR of decoupled payments relative to the pre-reform situation. However, there is a relatively large 
variation in the reform effects between MS particularly between Old Member States (OMS) and New MS 
(NMS). In NMS the capitalization rate slightly reduces from 76% in the pre-reform period to 72% in the post-
reform period. Although, the rate is significantly lower in OMS, it almost doubles (from 20% to 39%) due to the 
reform. The main source of the post-reform capitalization in the EU are the entitlement stock changes 
accounting for 19% of total post-reform capitalization level, followed by the internal convergence of payments 
with 18%, the budget change (including external convergence) with 1%, and the differentiation of payments 
(redistributive payment) with -7%. Overall, our estimates suggest that on average in the EU, the non-farming 
landowners’ policy gains are 25% of total decoupled payments in the post-reform period compared to 17% in 
the pre-reform period. 
 
Key words: Capitalization, Decoupled subsidies, CAP reform, Land market, Land prices, 
Land rents, EU. 
JEL codes: H22, Q11, Q18. 
 
1. Introduction 
Annually, the European Union (EU) spends around 58 billion euro on the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the aim of supporting farmers’ income and the production of 
public goods, such as landscape and clean environment. The majority of CAP subsidies are 
disbursed in form of decoupled direct payments represented by the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPS) and the Single Area Payment System (SAPS). Decoupled payments were introduced 
by the 2003 CAP reform. In 2013 they underwent substantial reform changing both the 
implementation form and the payment level (EU 2013; European Commission 2013b; 
                                                 
1
The authors are solely responsible for the content of the paper. The views expressed are purely those of the 
authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European 
Commission. 
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European Commission 2016).  
The capitalization of agricultural subsidies was subject to extensive empirical and 
theoretical research in the literature. Both empirical and theoretical findings suggest that 
agricultural subsidies increase land prices and thus generate benefits also to landowners. 
However, there is no consensus on the magnitude of the actual capitalization effects of 
subsidies, as it depends on a number of factors such as type of support, imperfections in 
factor markets, the structure of competition in the food supply chain and transaction costs 
(Alston and James 2002; de Gorter and Meilke 1989; Dewbre, Anton, and Thompson 2001; 
Gardner 1983; Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 2004; Desquilbet and Guyomard 2002; Kirwan 
2009; Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston 2001; McCorriston and Sheldon 1991; Salhofer and 
Schmid 2004; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006; 2009; de Gorter 1992). Further, there is a significant 
discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical findings as estimations tend to suggest a 
lower capitalization of agricultural subsidies than the theory implies. This is particularly the 
case of area-based subsidies such as the SPS and the SAPS. While the theory is able to rank 
clearly the various types of area-based agricultural subsidies by their incidence level, the 
empirical evidence is less conclusive on the exact capitalization rate (Patton et al 2008; 
Breustedt and Habermann 2011; Ciaian and Kancs 2012; Kilian et al. 2012; Van Herck 
Swinnen and Vranken 2013; Guastella et al. 2014; O’Neill and Hanrahan 2016). 
There are a growing number of studies analyzing the capitalization of EU decoupled 
subsidies. Most studies have analyzed capitalization effects of the 2003 CAP reform (e.g. 
Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen 2008; Courleux et al. 2008, Kilian and Salhofer 2008; Ciaian 
and Kancs 2012; Kilian et al. 2012; O’Neill and Hanrahan 2016; Van Herck, Swinnen and 
Vranken 2013; Michalek, Ciaian and Kancs 2014; Guastella et al. 2014; Feichtinger and 
Salhofer 2015a, 2015b; Klaiber, Salhofer and Thompson 2016). The capitalization of the 
2013 CAP reform was studied to a much lesser extent. To our knowledge only Gocht et al. 
(2013) and Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2014) analyzed potential capitalization effects of the 
2013 CAP reform proposal prior to its adoption and implementation.  
The 2013 CAP reform provides a menu of possible options to implement decoupled 
subsidies. Member States (MS) could choose the exact reform strategy of their decoupled 
subsidies from a pre-defined set of options leading to a large heterogeneity in implementation 
between countries. The main CAP reform elements that vary between MS include: 
harmonization of payments between farms (internal convergence), differentiation in per 
hectare payments (redistributive payment) and changes in the reference period for the 
entitlement allocation. Additionally, the reform led to budgetary changes and partial 
harmonization of decoupled payments across MS (external convergence) as well as it 
introduced the ‘CAP greening’ top-up component of decoupled payments aiming at linking 
them to “agricultural practices beneficial to climate and environment” (EU 2013; European 
Commission 2016). 
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The objective of this study is to analyze the expected capitalization effects of the 2013 
CAP reform; that is to what extent decoupled payments are incorporated into higher land 
values. We investigate the specific implementation of the 2013 CAP reform across MS and 
analyze how different elements of the 2013 reform may alter the capitalization rate relative to 
the pre-reform period. The main contribution of this study to the existing literature is to 
provide a detailed overview of expected capitalization effects of the 2013 CAP reform by 
accounting for the implementation heterogeneity across MS. This paper is a follow-up 
analysis of the study "Possible Effects on EU Land Markets of New CAP Direct Payments" 
prepared for the European Parliament in 2013, which analyzed the reform proposal and did 
not consider its actual implementation.
2
 
The SPS capitalization has important policy implications for the EU. Decoupled 
payments may be leaked to landowners instead of farmers, if the CAP reform increases the 
decoupled payment capitalization into higher land values. The level of decoupled payment 
leakage to non-farming sector depends on the extent of land renting (which is quite 
significant in EU). On average 54%, of farmland is rented in the EU. However, there are 
important differences among EU Member States because of differences in land market 
structure (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2010). MS with a high share of rented land (more than 
70%) include Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Belgium and Malta. MS with a 
low share of rented land (less than 30%) include Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Portugal. 
These variations affect the extent to which farmers versus non-farming landowners capture 
policy rents. While there is some farm-to-farm land renting in the EU, by far most of the 
rented out land is owned by non-farming landowners. 
The study is organized as follows. The following section describes agricultural land 
markets in the EU. The third section introduces decoupled payments in the pre- and the post-
2013 CAP reform period. The fourth section summarizes the main findings from the literature 
on the pre-reform capitalization of decoupled payments. The fifth section describes the 
conceptual and the empirical framework to analyze the impact of each element of the 2013 
CAP reform on the decoupled payment capitalization, followed by the results described in the 
section six. The seventh section draws conclusions. 
 
2. Agricultural land markets in the European Union 
The farmland sales markets are relatively thin in the European Union. The share of the 
annually transacted agricultural land area in the total utilized agriculture area (UAA) ranges 
between 0.1% in Slovakia to 8% in Lithuania (Table 1). The transacted area tends to be stable 
over time in Old Member States (OMS).
3
 In New Member States (NMS),
4
 the available 
                                                 
2
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/495866/IPOL-
AGRI_ET%282013%29495866_EN.pdf 
3
 OMS refers to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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evidence suggests an increase in the transacted area over time, eventually induced by 
structural changes in agriculture due to the transition process and the EU enlargement (Ciaian 
et al. 2012).  
Land sales price developments show greater dynamics. Overall, an upward trend in 
price development tends to prevail in land sales across EU Member States in the period 
1995–2009 (Figure 1). The observed price increase can be explained by the food price 
increase, a shift to a land-based subsidy system in the EU, and a general productivity growth 
(Ciaian and Kancs 2012; Michalek et al. 2014).  
The levels of agricultural land sales prices vary strongly within the EU. Figure 1 
compares the level of sales prices among EU Member States in 1995, 2002, and 2009. The 
strongest difference in the price level is between OMS and NMS. On average, land prices in 
OMS are several times higher than in NMS and these price differences tend to persist over 
time. The lowest land price is recorded in Lithuania followed by Latvia, Bulgaria, and 
Slovakia. In contrast, the Netherlands recorded the highest agricultural land prices in the EU. 
Land prices are also high in Denmark and Luxemburg. From the surveyed NMS, the Czech 
Republic has the highest land prices. Nevertheless, if compared to the Netherlands, the Czech 
prices were lower by factor 20 in 2009. Sweden and France have more comparable price 
levels to NMS, though the gap is still substantial, more than 50% higher, when compared to 
land prices in the Czech Republic.  
The land rental market seems to be more important than the sales market in terms of 
the agricultural area. The share of the rented land in the EU represented 54% of agricultural 
area in 2013, increasing from 52% in 2004 and from 50% in 2000. There is a strong variation 
in land renting among the Member States. In OMS, the share of rented land in 2013 ranged 
between 19% in Ireland and 88% in France, while in NMS it ranged between 27% in Poland 
and 94% in Slovakia (Table 2). 
During the period 2004–2013, the land renting decreased in roughly one half of 
Member States, but increased in the other half. However, increases in the land renting tend to 
be larger (varying between 3% and 20%) than decreases (varying between -1% and -10%). A 
particularly strong expansion of the land renting (more than 10%) occurred in Greece, Italy, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Countries with the most significant decrease in the land 
renting (more than -5%) include Austria, Germany, Hungary, Portugal and the Czech 
Republic (Table 2). 
The rental price heterogeneity between Member States is less accentuated than the 
land sales price heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the cross-country variation has grown over time 
(from 1000% between the lowest and highest countries in 2000 to over 3500% in 2013). 
Although, rental prices are in general higher in OMS, several OMS (e.g., Portugal, Spain) 
report comparable levels to NMS. Rental prices varied in 2013 from €25 per hectare in Latvia 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 NMS refers to Member States which joined the EU in 2004 or later: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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to €974 per hectare in the Netherlands. However, in most Member States the agricultural land 
rental prices were in the range between €100 and €300 per hectare in 2013 (Table 3). With 
the exception of Greece, Ireland, Italy and the UK, rental prices increased in during period 
2004–2013. The rental price increase is significantly higher in NMS than in OMS, which was 
likely induced by productivity growth and the introduction of the CAP subsidies after the EU 
enlargement (Ciaian and Kancs 2012; Swinnen et al. 2013).  
 
3. Decoupled payments in the EU 
3.1. Pre-reform decoupled payments  
Two types of decoupled payments were implemented in the European Union prior to the 
2013 CAP reform: the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) and the Single Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS). Both types of decoupled payments were introduced by the 2003 CAP reform. 
Under the SPS, each farm was allocated a certain amount of the SPS entitlements. 
Farms are eligible for the SPS if they have both entitlements and an equal amount of an 
eligible land. The SPS is linked to land because, in the absence of an eligible land, farms 
cannot activate (cash in) the SPS entitlements. However, the SPS is not linked to a specific 
land area – the SPS entitlements can be activated by any eligible farmland in the region. 
Farms can expand or decrease their stock of entitlements by buying or selling entitlements on 
the agricultural land market.
5
  
When implementing the SPS, MS could choose between three different SPS models: 
the historical model, the regional (flat-rate) model, and the hybrid model. Under the 
historical model, the SPS is farm-specific and equals the support the farm has received in the 
“reference” period, i.e. when coupled subsidies were disbursed. Under the regional model, an 
equal per hectare payment is granted to all farms in a given region. The hybrid model is a 
combination of historical and regional models. The key difference between the three models 
is in the unit value of entitlements: under the historical and hybrid models, the value of 
entitlement varies between farms (stronger in the former than in the latter), whereas under the 
regional SPS model, all farms within a region have entitlements with the same unit value.  
The most commonly implemented SPS model in the EU is the historical model. It is 
used in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
and Wales and Scotland (UK). Malta and Slovenia implement the regional SPS model. 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, Sweden, England and Northern Ireland (UK) use 
the hybrid model (either the static or dynamic version). MS implementing the dynamic hybrid 
model gradually move to a fully regional (flat-rate) model (Finland, Germany, UK- England), 
whereas MS implementing the static hybrid model maintain the payment variation across 
farms (i.e. the regional and historical shares do not change over time) (Denmark, 
                                                 
5
 Note that entitlement trade is allowed only within MS, not between them, implying that a given entitlement 
can be activated only on the land in a given MS. 
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Luxembourg, Sweden, UK- Northern Ireland). 
Table 4 reports the number of activated entitlements relative to the utilized 
agricultural area (UAA) for MS which implement the SPS. In several MS, the share of 
activated entitlements roughly correspond to the UAA (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
Sweden), whereas in other MS the ratio of activated entitlements to UAA is significantly 
below one (e.g. Spain, Italy, Malta, France, Portugal). The share of activated entitlements in 
the UAA tends to be larger in countries that have implemented the hybrid model than in 
countries using the historical model. This is because under the historical model the total 
number of entitlements corresponds to the number of hectares that was eligible to subsidies in 
the reference period. Under the hybrid model (or regional model), the total number of 
entitlements was equal to the entire eligible land area at the time of the SPS introduction. 
The SAPS is implemented only in NMS. A key difference between the SAPS and the 
SPS is the area eligible for the decoupled payment. Under the SAPS, the entire eligible area 
that farmers use can receive a per hectare payment; there are no entitlements as in the case of 
the SPS. Another key difference between the SAPS and the SPS is in the value of the per 
hectare payment. Under the SAPS, all farms in a every Member State (or region within a 
Member State) receive an equal per hectare payment (i.e. flat-rate payment), whereas under 
the SPS, the payment value can differ depending on the type of the SPS model. 
Farm eligibility for decoupled payments is subject to cross-compliance. Each farm 
that receives the SPS/SAPS must comply with the Statutory Management Requirements 
(SMR), and maintain land according to the Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition 
(GAEC). The SMR are based on EU regulations in fields of environment, public, animal and 
plant health, and animal welfare. The GAEC includes a set of standards requiring farms to 
ensure the soil protection, the maintenance of soil organic matter and soil structure, and the 
safe-guarding of landscape features and habitats. 
 
3.2. The 2013 CAP reform 
The key changes introduced by the 2013 CAP to decoupled payments can be summarized as 
follows (EU 2013; European Commission 2015, 2016):
6
  
I. Budget change and external convergence of payments: The budget allocated to 
                                                 
6
 The 2013 CAP reform replaced the SPS payments with the basic payment scheme (BPS). Similarly as the SPS, 
the BPS is also based on payment entitlements that can be activated only if accompanied by eligible land. The 
key difference between the SPS and the BPS is that the latter grants basic layer of support to farmers which is 
topped-up by other payments targeting specific issues or specific types of beneficiaries such as the greening 
payments, redistributive payments, etc. (European Commission 2016). Thus the total value of decoupled 
payments a farm receives is equal to BPS plus other top-up payment elements (i.e. greening payments, 
redistributive payments, payments for Areas of Natural Constraints (ANC), the young farmer scheme, the 
Decoupled Complementary National Direct Payments (DCNDP) for new MS. In addition, in case farms exceed 
a certain threshold (the default value is 150000 Euros), the total BPS payments get reduced (capping). To 
simplify the terminology and keep it consistent over the whole paper we refer to these payments as SPS (i.e. the 
combined value of BPS, greening payments and redistributive payment. The ANC, capping, young farmer 
scheme and DCNDP are not considered in the total SPS value. 
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decoupled payments (SPS and SAPS) for MS changes for several reasons: the overall 
budget was reduced, there was a partial harmonization of payments across MS, the 
CAP budget could be reallocated between coupled subsidies or other CAP 
expenditures (e.g. the Rural Development Programme (RDP).  
II. Internal convergence of payments: The CAP reforms require a convergence of the 
SPS payments, which implies a harmonization of the SPS across farms (i.e. towards a 
flat-rate SPS value) at MS (or regional) level.  
III. Differentiation of payments: Some changes increase the differentiation in per hectare 
payments to certain farm types. The most important reform element that differentiates 
payments between farms is the redistributive payment under which farmers may 
receive a higher payment value for the first hectares than for the rest of area. This 
reform element increases the differentiation of the per hectare payment value within 
MS and regions (and thus goes in an opposite direction as compared to the internal 
convergence of payments). Another elements that affects the differentiation of total 
decoupled payments are the ANC, young farmer scheme, capping and DCNDP. 
However, the impact of these payments is not analyzed in this paper as their size is 
relatively small. 
IV. Entitlement allocation method: MS can choose to maintain old entitlements or to 
allocate new entitlements. 
V. CAP greening: There are stronger linkages of decoupled payments to “agricultural 
practices beneficial to the climate and environment” (the so called 'CAP greening').7 
 
The 2013 CAP reform offers certain flexibility to Member States regarding specific 
implementation of these five reform elements. Thus, the actual adoption of the different 
reform elements could differ between MS. However, the choice is not fully flexible and 
depends on the past implementation system of decoupled payments. For example, MS that 
had heterogeneous value of payments across farms (e.g. the historical SPS model) are 
required to (fully or partially) harmonize them. The MS applying the SAPS may extend the 
use of this system; however this scheme is not available to MS that implemented the SPS 
under the previous CAP. 
                                                 
7
 SPS will be supplemented by an additional 'greening' payment taking up to 30% of the total direct payment 
funds, if farms respect the 'greening' requirements: crop diversification, maintenance of permanent grassland 
and ecological focus area (EFA). Under the crop diversification, the cultivation of the arable land needs to 
include at least two different crops on farms cultivating between 10 and 30 hectare of arable land and at least 
three crops on farms with a larger arable area. The main crop should not exceed 75% of arable land, and the two 
main crops should not exceed 95% of the arable area. Under the maintenance of permanent grassland, farms are 
required not to convert and to plough permanent grassland. The EFA measure requires farms larger than 15 
hectares to allocate at least 5 % of farms' eligible area (excluding areas under grassland) to ecological focus 
area, with the possibility of increasing this percentage to 7% subject to an evaluation review in 2017. The area 
that qualifies as ecological focus area includes fallow land, terraces, landscape features, buffer strips, green 
cover, etc. In order to avoid penalizing those farms that already address environmental and sustainability issues, 
the "greening equivalency" system is applied whereby the application of environmentally beneficial practices 
already in place are considered to replace these three basic greening requirements (EU 2013). 
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Further, Member States may apply the decoupled payment scheme at the regional 
level by splitting country in separate regions among which the reform implementation could 
differ. Among the 18 MS implementing the SPS prior to the reform, six decided to 
regionalize the SPS: France (two regions: Corcega and Hexagon), Germany (by 
administrative regions), Finland (two regions determined by natural constraints), Spain (50 
regions determined by historical land uses (irrigate, non- irrigated, permanent crop and 
grassland) and county), Greece (regions determined by historical land uses: grazing areas, 
arable land and permanent crops), United Kingdom (three regions in England determined by 
natural characteristics
8
 and three regions in Scotland determined by land uses and natural 
characteristics). The remaining 12 MS apply the SPS at the national level. Member States that 
applied the SAPS before the reform continue to apply the SAPS at the national level 
(European Commission 2015, 2016). The main consequence of the regional implementation 
of decoupled payments is that the payment value per hectare may differ between regions 
within MS even if each region implements a flat-rate system (e.g. the regional SPS model). 
 
4. Pre-reform capitalization: Insights from the literature 
4.1. Previous conceptual studies on the SPS 
Previous studies that have conceptually investigated the impact of decoupled payments on 
land markets (Ciaian and Swinnen 2006; Courleux et al. 2008; Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen 
2008, 2010; Kilian and Salhofer 2008; Feichtinger and Salhofer 2013; Viaggi et al. 2013) 
show that their implementation details are important determinants of the magnitude of the 
capitalization level. The key findings of the previous literature can be summarized as follows: 
The capitalization of the SPS depends strongly on the ratio of the eligible area to the 
total number of entitlements. If there are more entitlements (“surplus”) than the eligible area, 
then the SPS leads to a land price increase (“is capitalized in land prices”). However, if there 
are less entitlements (“deficit”) than the eligible land, then the SPS does not increase land 
prices (“not capitalized in land values”). The intuition is that the more entitlements are 
allocated to farms (compared to the eligible land), the more farms will compete for the 
eligible land to activate entitlements in order to cash the SPS. The increased demand for land 
will cause land prices to go up.  
The share of the SPS that is capitalized is higher for low than for high payments. As 
farms with high value entitlements compete with farms holding low value entitlements, farms 
owning high value entitlements can afford to pay higher rents, but will only bid up the land 
rent to the low value entitlements, at maximum. Thus, low value entitlements will determine 
the SPS capitalization at the margin. 
The capitalization of the SPS in land prices is higher under the regional (flat-rate) 
                                                 
8
 English non-SDA (Severely Disadvantage Area); English-SDA non-moorland; English SDA-moorland. 
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SPS model than under the historical SPS model. With the regional model there is no 
difference in the SPS entitlements among farms, while there may be large differences with 
the historical model. An implication of this is that the larger are the differences between 
farms in terms of the SPS entitlements, the smaller will be the capitalization of the SPS – 
because the smallest value will determine the level of capitalization. Hence, everything else 
equal, the SPS capitalization will be higher in the regional model.  
The more difficult it is to trade entitlements, the more the SPS becomes capitalized 
into land values. Under constrained trade, farms are more likely to keep their entitlements 
(instead of selling them) and to use them to compete for land, which exerts an upward 
pressure on land prices. In other words, entitlements indirectly become farm specific or 
practically attached to the farmer's land if trade is constrained. In contrast, facilitation of 
entitlement trade may actually play a role in reducing the potential SPS capitalization, as it 
will reduce pressure of the SPS on land markets. In principle, full tradability cuts the link 
between entitlements and a specific land area or a specific farmer thus reducing the SPS 
impact on the land market. The impact of the tradability on the SPS capitalization is more 
significant in the case of deficit entitlements. With surplus entitlements, the SPS is 
capitalized anyway, implying that tradability is less important in determining the 
capitalization. In this case low tradability also leads to a higher SPS capitalization but its 
effect is rather secondary and thus smaller in the magnitude.  
The capitalization rate will be equal or higher under the SAPS than under the SPS. 
There are no entitlements associated with the SAPS, and all farms receive the same value of 
per hectare payment. Given that there are no entitlements associated with area payments - all 
farms receive the same value of the subsidy and all eligible land can benefit from them - their 
impact on land rents is similar to the case of the regional SPS model with flat-rate payments 
and with surplus entitlements. This implies that, for an equivalent value of area payment, the 
capitalization rate of the SAPS is equal to or higher than the capitalization rate of the SPS. 
The capitalization of decoupled payments in land prices is higher when the supply of 
land is less elastic. In the extreme case, with fixed land supply, decoupled payments may get 
fully capitalized in land prices, i.e. all subsidies go to landowners because the land rent 
increase is equal to the subsidy per hectare. This result holds both for the SAPS and for the 
SPS, if there are sufficient entitlements.  
The capitalization of decoupled payments in land prices might be lower with cross-
compliance. Cross-compliance requirements imply additional costs to land users, which 
reduces the demand for land and thus the (positive) effects of decoupled payments on land 
rents will be smaller. 
The capitalization of decoupled payments in land prices is lower when land prices are 
regulated. Land market regulations in the EU-27 vary strongly among Member States.
9
 Of 
                                                 
9
 See Swinnen, Van Herck, and Vranken (2013) for a detailed analysis of land market regulations in EU 
Member States. 
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particular importance for decoupled payments capitalization are maximum price regulations. 
The potential capitalization of decoupled payments into land rents will be reduced in the 
presence of a rental price ceiling. On the other hand, to overcome the rental price regulation 
(i.e. the maximum price intervention), farmers will have the incentive to pay unofficial 
payments (bribe) to landowners to prevent the loss of land to competing farms.  
The capitalization of decoupled payments in land prices is higher when they reduce 
credit constraints. Many farms, in particular in the poorer rural regions of the EU, face credit 
market constraints. Access to cash payments (decoupled payments) may reduce credit market 
constraints, either directly by increasing farms' cash flow or indirectly through an easier 
access to bank loans. This will increase capitalization of decoupled payments, because it 
increases farm productivity and hence the demand for land.  
(Changes in) the capitalization of decoupled payments in rental prices is more 
gradual with long term rental contracts. With short run contracts (as e.g. in Ireland), the 
rental price adjustments can occur fast to changes taking place in the land market (including 
changes to decoupled payments); with long term contracts the rental price adjustments will 
occur more slowly, as rental price may change only upon a contract expiration. The length of 
the rental contracts vary strongly (often because of regulations) across EU regions with many 
MS having the rental contract duration longer than 5 years or more (e.g. Belgium and France, 
the Netherlands, Slovakia).
10
 
 
4.2. Empirical evidence 
There are a growing number of studies empirically estimating the capitalization of pre-reform 
decoupled subsidies. The results of these studies are summarized in Table 5. All studies can 
be regrouped into two broad categories: land sales price studies and land rental price 
studies.
11
 Most studies focus on land rental prices since data on land rents are more widely 
available. Land sales price studies usually estimate the capitalization elasticity representing 
the percentage change in land price per 1 percent increase in subsidies, whereas rental studies 
typically estimate capitalization rate measuring the share of subsidy capitalized into land 
rents. 
Two studies, using very different datasets, have estimated the impact of the SAPS on 
land rents in NMS. Ciaian and Kancs (2012) use a firm-level panel dataset of more than 
10,000 farms in seven NMS in 2004 and 2005. Van Herck, Swinnen and Vranken (2013) use 
country level-data on average land rents and the SAPS for six NMS over the period 1994–
                                                 
10
 According to Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen (2010), the key determinants of rental contract durations in the EU 
are social norms (e.g. in Greece), governmental regulations (e.g. there is a minimum of 9 years in Belgium and 
France, 6 years in the Netherlands and 5 in Spain), and market institutions (e.g. Germany, Italy, Sweden). 
Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) even the renewal of rental contracts is regulated. 
11
 The capitalization effect on land sale price is equivalent to the capitalization effect on rental prices if the sale 
prices follow the asset pricing formula where land price equals the sum of discounted future rental prices. 
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2009. Both studies find remarkably similar results: they find that between €0.15 and €0.32 
per additional euro of the SAPS is capitalized in higher rental prices. These estimates appear 
somewhat low, given that theory suggests a considerably higher capitalization rate. One 
explanation for this rather low capitalization level could be the presence of land market 
rigidities (including regulations) that hamper the full adjustment of land sales and rental 
prices, particularly given that both studies cover the first few years of the SAPS 
implementation when its full effect might have not materialized.  
The estimates of the capitalization rates for the SPS vary more across studies. This is 
mainly because of a different regional coverage, which captures different SPS 
implementation models as well as due to the variation of estimation methodology between 
studies (Table 5). Michalek et al. (2014) estimate the capitalization of the SPS into land rents 
using farm-level data across OMS for the early period of the SPS implementation (2004 to 
2007). They find a relatively low capitalization rate of only 6% to 10%. However, Michalek, 
Ciaian and Kancs (2014) also show that there is a significant variation in the SPS 
capitalization rate across OMS, among regions and among farms. Moreover, their estimates 
confirm the theoretical predictions of lower SPS capitalization in the historical model than 
the hybrid model. O’Neill and Hanrahan (2016) estimate the short-run capitalization rate in 
the same magnitude for Ireland (historical model) as Michalek, Ciaian and Kancs (2014): 
between 7% and 25%. The long-run the capitalization rate is larger between 21% and 53%. 
Guastella et al. (2014) find a statistically insignificant impact of the SPS on land rents in 
Italy, where the historical SPS model is implemented.  
Nilsson and Johansson (2013) analyze the SPS impacts in Sweden, whereas Kilian et 
al. (2012), Feichtinger and Salhofer (2015b) and Klaiber, Salhofer and Thompson (2016) 
analyze the SPS impacts in Bavaria (Germany) and find a comparably high capitalization 
rate. The former study finds that the elasticity of agricultural land sales price with respect to 
the SPS is 0.54 (i.e., a 1 percent increase in the SPS increases land sales price by 0.54 
percent), whereas the latter three studies find that 35% to 94% of the SPS are capitalized into 
land rental prices. Both Sweden and Germany implement the hybrid model where the 
entitlements are more abundant relative to total land and payments are more homogenous, 
which, according to the theoretical predictions, is expected to result in a higher capitalization 
of the SPS. Similar to Michalek, Ciaian and Kancs (2014), the estimates of Klaiber, Salhofer 
and Thompson (2016) show that the gradual transition to harmonized payments (the regional 
SPS model) in Germany led to an increase of the capitalization rate from 37% in 2005 at the 
time of the SPS introduction when decoupled payments were most heterogeneous to 57% in 
2012 when the payments were partially harmonized.  
In contrast, Karlsson and Nilsson’s (2014) estimates suggest no impact of the SPS on 
land sales prices in Sweden (hybrid model). This contradicts the findings of Nilsson and 
Johansson (2013). Both studies use the same data from the Swedish Mapping, Cadastral and 
Land Registration Authority for the period January 2007 to December 2008. The two studies 
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differ in the methodology they employ. Karlsson and Nilsson (2014) use a spatial multilevel 
model that accounts for spatial spillover effects and interdependencies, while Nilsson and 
Johansson (2013) apply asset-pricing model where land price is determined by the expected 
returns from its current and potential future uses. These differences in methodology imply 
that when controlling for interdependencies between local and regional factors and spatial 
spillover effects between neighboring farms, the SPS becomes unimportant in determining 
land sales prices. Similarly, Feichtinger and Salhofer (2015b) control for spatial spillover 
effects and interdependencies and find lower capitalization elasticity for sales prices in 
Bavaria in Germany (0.20–0.28) than Nilsson and Johansson (2013). 
In general, with few exceptions, the estimated capitalization of the SPS appears to be 
more in line with theoretical predictions than the SAPS. However, the estimated 
capitalization rates for both types of payments could be underestimated due to the presence of 
various tenancy arrangements and land market regulations. In particular, long duration rental 
contracts and maximum rental price interventions applied in several countries can prevent full 
price adjustments or cause sluggish adjustment of land rents to subsidies, implying that the 
effect may not be full and immediate. Studies that focus specifically on short-term or new 
contracts find considerably higher capitalization rates. For example, Patton et al. (2008) in 
their analysis of Northern Ireland only include farms with rental contracts of one year or less, 
and exclude all longer-term rental contracts. They find that the capitalization of land-based 
subsidies (i.e. the Less Favoured Area payment) is more than 100%. Also Kilian et al. (2012) 
find that the SPS capitalization effect is significantly higher for newly signed rental contracts 
in Bavaria (Germany). Further, Latruffe et al. (2013) find that land market regulations linked 
to intervention of public authority (i.e., SAFER)
12
 in land markets reduce land sales prices in 
Brittany (France). This is because of the pre-emptive rights of SAFER which allows 
maintaining lower market prices by purchasing land if price is too high and sell it back at a 
lower price. 
 
5. Impact of the 2013 CAP reform 
5.1. Conceptual framework 
To provide theoretical insides of the impact of the 2013 CAP reform on the decoupled 
payment capitalization we adopt the stylized conceptual framework developed by Ciaian, 
Kancs and Swinnen (2014). The main reason for choosing this approach is that data on the 
effects of the new CAP instruments are not available and thus econometric estimations are 
not possible. In the next section, using the results of the conceptual analysis, we derive 
                                                 
12
 SAFER is regional organization in France in charge to control the local land markets through its power to 
buy, sell, and rent out agricultural land. 
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comparative static results and attempt to quantify the capitalization effects of the 2013 CAP 
reform.  
Following Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2014), we assume that: (i) output and variable 
input equilibrium prices are exogenous; (ii) there is a possibility for an increase or decrease in 
the total land use, i.e. upward sloping land supply; (iii) the entire land is owned by 
“landowners”, who rent land to “farms”; (iv) there are two types of regions, which are equal 
in all respects except for the land supply; (v) there are two types of entitlements in the case of 
the SPS; (vi)  the SPS entitlements are fully tradable within regions, but non-tradable 
between regions;
13
 and (vii) decoupled payments are allocated to farms.
14
 
The land market is illustrated in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows the quantity of 
land, A, the vertical axis measures the rental price, r, and the decoupled payment, t. The 
aggregate land demand without decoupled payment is given by the downward sloping curve 
DD. The land supply in region 1 is given by curve S1, and the land supply in region 2 is given 
by curve S2. The land market equilibriums at the zero support regime, are (A1
*
, r1
*
) and (A2
*
, 
r2
*
) in region 1 and region 2, respectively. Although, the productivity is the same for all farms 
(i.e. the land demand is the same in region 1 and region 2), there is less land used in 
equilibrium in region 1 than in region 2 due to a lower land supply.  
We consider two types of the SPS entitlements. The stock of type 1 entitlements, 
1
EA , 
has a unit face value t
1
, and the stock of type 2 entitlements, 
2
EA , has a face value t
2
. The 
aggregate stock of entitlements, AE
T
, is the sum of the two types, i.e. 
T
EEE AAA 
21
. In the 
regional (flat-rate) model both types of entitlements have equal face value, 21 ttt r  . In the 
hybrid and historical models the face value of entitlements differs, t
1
 ≠ t2. In the case of the 
SAPS there are no entitlements - all land, A, is eligible for receiving payment - and the 
payments per hectare are homogenous. 
 
5.2. Budget change and external convergence of payments (Reform I) 
The 2013 CAP reform implies a decline in the EU budget for decoupled payments due to the 
reduced overall CAP budget, and within the reduced overall budget, a reallocation of the SPS 
budget among MS due to the external convergence.
15
 Further, the decoupled payment budget 
                                                 
13
 This latter assumption implies that entitlement ownership dos not matter with respect to which farms own 
them within the region; they will always end up with farms with highest willingness to pay for them in that 
region (for more details on entitlement tradability see Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen 2008). 
14
 Such a conceptual framework is useful to analyze and understand the capitalization effects, but one should 
carefully interpret the results in the context of income distributional effects. Many farms in the EU own (at least 
part) of the land they operate. Hence, they are both “landowner” and “farm”, but this differs strongly between 
farms and member states (and regions within member states). In addition, while we do not explicitly model land 
sales, the results of our analysis are relevant for land sales markets under plausible conditions. The results of this 
model can be extended to land sales markets if the sale price of land is assumed to be adequately approximated 
by the sum of discounted future rental prices. Kilian and Salhofer (2008) show that under these conditions, the 
rental price changes derived in the paper are equivalent to sale price changes. 
15
 The aim of the external convergence is to rebalance the CAP support among MS. However, the external 
convergence does not fully harmonise the payments among MS; they are only partially adjusted either upwards 
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could change because MS could shift resources between coupled and decoupled payments as 
well as relocate between direct payments and the RDP support. This means that in MS with a 
high payment value per hectare the total decoupled subsidy budget may decline due to 
external convergence, whereas in the MS with a low payment value per hectare the total 
decoupled payment budget may increase. However, the other three factors may drive the 
budget change in either direction depending on the size of the effects.  
Overall, the budget change will have a differentiated impact across MS, depending on 
whether the country will receive more or less from the SPS and whether entitlements are in 
deficit or in surplus.  
As a starting point, we consider the flat-rate SPS model (i.e. regional model) with 
entitlements rt  in the pre-reform period. This is illustrated in Figure 2. If the total amount of 
entitlement is AE
T
 (and entitlements can be traded) then the bold line DrD represents the 
(kinked) demand curve with the SPS with the distance between both functions is determined 
by the level of the SPS (= t
r
 in the figure). Given that farms need land to activate their 
entitlements and cash-in the SPS, farms' willingness to pay for land increases by the value of 
entitlement, rt . This holds until all entitlements are exhausted, i.e. up to AE
T
. After this point, 
land demand is the same with and without the SPS, as there are no unused entitlements 
available. The equilibriums with rt  in the pre-reform period are (A1r, r1r) and (A2, r2
*
) in 
region 1 and region 2, respectively.  
As is evident from Figure 2, the effects of CAP reform on the land market are very 
different in the two regions. In region 1, where there is a shortage of land compared to the 
amount of entitlements (A1
*
 < AE
T
), the equilibrium changes. Consider the SPS budget 
increase which extends the entitlement value from rt  to rht , where rrh tt  . The impact on 
land markets is reflected in an upward shift in the land demand from DrD to DrhD. The land 
market equilibrium shifts from (A1r, r1r) to (A1rh, r1rh). Land use and land rent increase by 
A1rh
*
 - A1r
*
 and by r1rh
*
 - r1r
*
, respectively.
16
 Competition for land will drive up land rental 
prices. However, in region 2, where there is more land available than there are entitlements 
(A2
*
 > AE
T
), there is no impact on the land market. The land market equilibrium remains at 
(A2
*
, r2
*
). Land rents do not change, nor does the land use. The SPS payments fully increase 
farm incomes. The SPS has a zero-distortive marginal effect on farm rental decisions in this 
region. 
Reductions in the level of the SPS will have an opposite effect as the increase of the 
SPS. The level of t
r
 will decline and this may change land rents and land allocation, or not, 
                                                                                                                                                        
or downwards to bring them closer to the EU average level. More specifically, the national budgets of MS 
where the average payment (in EUR per hectare) is below 90% of the EU average are gradually increased (by 
one third of the difference between their current rate and 90% of the EU average). This convergence is financed 
proportionally by MS that have payment levels above the EU average level (EU 2013). 
16
 Note that we do not exclude the possibility that the marginal land used to activate entitlements might be left 
uncultivated. The choice between using land in production versus leaving it uncultivated depends on the costs to 
keep it in good agricultural conditions required by the SPS eligibility (i.e. cross-compliance) relative to the costs 
of using it in production. Implicitly we assume that these costs are equal in our figures. For more detailed 
analysis on this issue see Courleux et al. (2008) and Kilian and Salhofer (2008). 
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depending on the ratio of entitlements to land rents. Consider a reduction of the SPS from rt  
to rlt , where rrl tt  . Land demand shifts downward from DrD to DrlD. In region 1, the land 
market equilibrium shifts to (A1rl , r1rl), land use reduces (by A1r
*
 - A1rl
*
) and cause a fall in 
land rents (by r1r
*
 - r1rl
*
). In region 2, the reduction in the SPS has no effect on the land 
market. 
The impact of the SAPS budget change on the land market (not shown in Figure 2) is 
analogous to the effects shown for region 1 where there is a shortage of land compared to the 
amount of entitlements. The only exception is that there are no entitlements with the SAPS, 
meaning that all land qualifies for payments. Similar to region 1, the 2013 CAP reform 
increases land rent if the SAPS per hectare increases, whereas the capitalization decreases if 
the SAPS per hectare is reduced. 
 
5.3. Internal convergence of payments (Reform II) 
The 2013 CAP reform aims to eliminate or reduce the heterogeneity of per hectare payments 
that farmers receive in a region or MS. This concerns MS that implemented the historical SPS 
model or the static hybrid SPS model prior to the reform. Other schemes allocated flat-rate 
payments prior to the reform (i.e. the SAPS, the regional SPS model or the dynamic hybrid 
model that moved to a flat-rate) and thus are not subject to the convergence requirements. 
Member States could choose either to apply (i) a full convergence; or (ii) a partial 
convergence (European Commission 2015). 
Under the full convergence, an equal per hectare payment is granted to all farms in a 
given region. This is similar to the regional SPS model or the SAPS implemented prior to the 
reform. MS could choose either to introduce flat-rate payment in the first year of the reform 
implementation (i.e. in 2015) or to introduce gradual harmonization of payments where the 
full convergence would be reached at least by 2019 or 2020 (European Commission 2015).  
Under the partial convergence, the payment heterogeneity across farms is reduced but 
is not completely eliminated. The mechanism of partial harmonization consist of reducing 
payment rate to farms with higher value payments and increasing payment rate to farms with 
low value payments. More specifically, farms receiving less than 90% of the 
regional/national average rate are granted a higher value payment with the guarantee that the 
payment is not lower than 60% of the national/regional average. The increase in payments is 
financed by the farmers that get payments above the regional/national average. The amounts 
available to farmers receiving more than the regional/national average are reduced 
proportionally, with an option for MS to limit the maximum loss of 30% relative to pre-
reform payments. Similar to the full convergence, MS may introduce the partial convergence 
in the first year of the reform implementation in 2015 or gradually by 2019 (European 
Commission 2015).  
The convergence of the SPS within a country/region, when the historical or the static 
hybrid SPS models are replaced by the SPS entitlements that are partially or fully 
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harmonized, is likely to increase land rents (thus increase the capitalization of the SPS in land 
prices). The reason is that land rents (and the capitalization of the SPS) are determined at the 
margin and the demand for land will go up at the margin with harmonization of payments. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3, which is extension of Figure 2. In Figure 2 we have the 
situation of a flat-rate model when all farms get the same SPS. In Figure 3 we introduce 
heterogeneity among farms in their entitlements – as for example the historic model does. 
Consider that there are two types of entitlements: high value SPS entitlements t
1
 and low 
value SPS entitlements t
2
. With tradability of entitlements, farms will first use the high-value 
entitlements, and then the low value entitlements.
17
 This implies a land demand function such 
as represented by the (double kinked) curve DhD. Relative to a no-support regime, the SPS 
shifts the land demand by t
1
 up to AE
1
, where all high value entitlements are activated. In the 
interval from AE
1
 to AE
T
 (where AE
T
 – AE
1
 = AE
2
) it is higher by t
2
, and it is the same after all 
entitlements are activated at AE
T
 (= AE
1
 + AE
2
).
18
 
To compare the effects of different SPS models, we keep the total amount (value) of 
the SPS entitlements constant. In previous sections we have shown that under the flat-rate 
model, the equilibrium was (A1r
*
, r1r
*
) in region 1 – where the land was binding, which is the 
more interesting case. Under the historical model the equilibrium in region 1 is (A1h
*
, r1h
*
). 
Hence, the land use will increase and land rents will go up with the shift from the historical to 
the flat-rate model. In Figure 3 we have considered a full convergence of payments by 
assuming a shift from the historical model to the flat-rate model. With a partial convergence 
(not shown in Figure 3), the impact on the land rent is still positive but smaller than with the 
full convergence and is proportional to the size of payment harmonization across farms. 
In region 2, there is no effect of the harmonization. The SPS has no impact on the 
land market when there is more land available than entitlements. The equilibrium (A2
*
, r2
*
) 
remains the same with or without the harmonization of payments. 
The introduction of the flat-rate model could increase the degree of the SPS 
capitalization also because it adds transparency to the land market. All entitlements have the 
same value within a region which could be observed by all market participants at zero costs. 
In contrast, with the historical/hybrid model the exact value of entitlements that farmers own 
may not be known by landowners, which may reduce their bargaining position with respect to 
farmers. This asymmetric information on entitlement values may reduce the capitalization in 
the historical model relative to the regional SPS model. 
 
                                                 
17
 Full tradability of entitlements implies that we can disentangle the entitlements from specific hectare of land 
or specific entitlement holder. Tradability of entitlements leads to a situation where first most valuable 
entitlements are exploited and are activated by farms with the highest willingness to pay for land renting and 
then less voluble ones are exploited (Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen 2008, Courleux et al. 2008 and Kilian and 
Salhofer 2008). 
18
 Note that most MS implementing historical model have entitlements with a continuum of face values. See 
Killian et al. (2012) for modelling of this situation. Our assumption of two entitlements is to simplify the 
exposition of the effects and it does not affect the general results. 
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5.4. Differentiation of payments between farms (Reform III) 
The 2013 CAP reform also includes several changes in decoupled payments, which may 
increase the differentiation in per hectare decoupled payments. The most important reform 
element that may induce higher variation in payments among farms is the redistributive 
payment. The redistributive payments aim at increasing the support for small and medium-
sized farms by granting a higher payment value for the first 30 hectares (or up to the average 
farm size if higher than 30 hectares) than for the rest of the farm area. MS can allocate up to 
30% of the decoupled payment budget for redistributive payments. This reform element 
effectively increases differentiation in per hectare payment value. 
The impact of these reforms can be analyzed in the framework we used to compare 
the historical and the flat-rate SPS models – as illustrated by Figure 3. For a given (fixed) 
total amount (value) of the SPS, an increased differentiation will have a similar effect, as 
going from the flat-rate to the historic model. By differentiating the SPS per hectare adds 
“kinks” to the land demand function. The result is that at the margin the demand will be 
lower than in the case of more harmonized payments. Hence, these reforms will likely reduce 
land rental prices and capitalization.  
Obviously this will be the case only in region 1 with surplus entitlements, where the 
SPS affects land markets.
19
 In region 2 with deficit entitlements, the capitalization effects 
(where farms absorb the entire SPS) are the same in both cases; with and without Reform III.  
Similar holds for the SAPS, where the differentiation of the hectare payments due to 
the redistributive payment reduces land rental prices and capitalization. The main intuition is 
similar to the SPS. Because only part of the farm’s agricultural land receives the 
redistributive payment (up to a maximum defined), the marginal land is not affected by the 
higher payment and thus the demand at the margin will be lower than in the case of flat-rate 
payments.  
 
5.5. Entitlement allocation (Reform IV) 
A key factor that will impact the capitalization of subsidies is whether the new entitlement 
allocation will be different from the pre-reform allocation. If the reform will not affect the 
entitlement allocation, there will obviously be no effect. However, if the allocation of 
entitlements will be influenced by the current (or future) land use, then farms (i.e. entitlement 
applicants) could affect the amount of new entitlement by adjusting their land use. This 
would provide an opportunity for entitlement applicants to obtain entitlements for more land 
than they had before the reform.
20
 
                                                 
19
 The actual size of these effects will depend on the farm heterogeneity because the implementation of the 
Reform III largely depends on farm characteristics (e.g. farms size). 
20
 In fact both types of reference periods were applied under the 2003 CAP reform. The number of hectares that 
generated support in the reference period (i.e. the pre-reform land use) was applied as the base for entitlement 
allocation in the historical model, while the land used in the first year of the SPS application was used as the 
base in the hybrid and regional models. 
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According to the 2013 CAP reform, the MS can choose (i) to maintain the old (pre-
reform) entitlement allocation or (ii) to allocate new entitlements based on the eligible area in 
the first year of the reform implementation (i.e. in 2015) to farms which were eligible for 
direct payments in 2013. Under the first option, MS could impose additional restriction that 
the number of entitlements does not exceed the eligible area in 2015. Under the second 
option, MS could limit the allocated entitlements to the minimum between the eligible area in 
2013 and the declared eligible area in 2015. Further, under both options MS could choose to 
allocate fewer entitlements for grassland (i.e. to apply the reduction coefficient) or to exclude 
land cultivated with vineyards and greenhouse. Alternatively, MS could grant new 
entitlements to farmers that were not eligible to receive direct payments under the old system 
(in 2013) such as vegetable producers, vineyards producers, etc. (European Commission 
2016).
21
  
The impact of the 2013 CAP reform on the SPS capitalization depends on whether it 
leads to the expansion of the entitlement stock or not. Obviously, in those MS where the old 
entitlement allocation is maintained, the capitalization effect of this reform element is zero, 
given that the stock of entitlement is not altered. An increase in the SPS capitalization may 
emerge in the second system of entitlement allocation. Under this allocation system, only 
those applicants who were eligible for direct payments in 2013 can receive new 
entitlements.
22
 However, the reform does not restrict the number of entitlements that an 
applicant can obtain. Applicants can apply for a number of entitlements equal to their optimal 
land use (taking into consideration both the economic return from land and the entitlement 
value) given that the entire eligible area in 2015 qualifies for new entitlements.
23
 This may 
lead to expansion of the number of entitlements relative to the eligible area and generate 
pressure on higher land rental prices on the land market. 
The land market effects of the second system of entitlement allocation are shown in 
Figure 4. We consider the situation before the implementation of the 2013 CAP reform with 
uniform entitlements t
r
, implying that the land demand is given by DrD and the land market 
equilibriums are (A1r
*
, r1r
*
) and (A2
*
, r2
*
) in region 1 (represented by land supply curve S1) 
and region 2 (represented by land supply curve S2), respectively.  
In a region where there are surplus entitlements in the pre-reform period (region 1 in 
Figure 4), the choice of the reference period may lead to a (small) reduction in land rents. The 
possibility to obtain new entitlements in the first year of the SPS implementation (in 2015 
according to the reform) will incentivize farmers to obtain additional entitlements. The size of 
                                                 
21
 The requirement in this case is that applicant was farming in 2013. This requirement is not applied in Spain 
and Luxembourg. 
22
 In some MS the farms eligible for receiving entitlement was extended to additional crops non-eligible in pre-
reform period. 
23
 Exceptions could be Belgium-Flanders, Ireland, Spain and Portugal which limit the allocated entitlements to 
the minimum between the eligible area in 2013 and the declared eligible area in 2015 which may lead to lower 
increase in the stock of entitlements relative to eligible area if substantial farm structural change took place 
between these two years. 
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the increase in entitlements will depend on the availability of land because, as defined in the 
2013 CAP reform, farms will be allocated new entitlements only if they are accompanied by 
an equal amount of the eligible land. The 2013 CAP reform attempts to limit the increase of 
the number of entitlements. It stipulates that, if the total claims for entitlements increase by 
more than 35% of the total eligible area in 2009, MS can limit the number of payment 
entitlements to be allocated in 2015 to either 135% or 145% of the total number of eligible 
hectares in 2009 (EU 2013). However, because of more entitlements and a fixed budget, the 
per unit entitlement will decline (to t
N
 in in Figure 4), and hence land rents will decline. The 
land rent and the land use will decline from r1r
*
 to r1
N
 and from A1r
*
 to A1
N
, respectively.
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This effect is likely to be very small (unless there would be a very large increase in 
entitlements, which appears unlikely). If the entitlement stock does not change significantly 
(e.g. due to the land availability constraint or other reasons), the land market effects will be 
virtually zero.
25
  
A larger change may occur in a region without the SPS capitalization (region 2 in 
Figure 4) because the amount of entitlements was less than the available land. An increase in 
entitlements could shift the ratio of entitlements/land to the point that the entitlement 
constraint is no longer binding and the SPS capitalization would increase. This is illustrated 
in Figure 4. The equilibrium land rents and land use increase from r2
*
 to r2
N
 and from A2
*
 to 
A2
N
, respectively. A small increase in entitlements has a disproportional effect on land 
markets, as rents increase strongly because of the competition for land, which has intensified 
at the margin.  
Our results suggest that Reform IV may have important implications for the SPS 
capitalization in those regions, where entitlements were in deficit in the pre-reform period. In 
regions with surplus entitlements, the SPS was already capitalized into land rents in the pre-
reform period, implying that the reference period may have only small land market impacts 
and thus not crucial for the SPS capitalization. Note that the Reform IV does not concern the 
SAPS, as there are no entitlements under this subsidy allocation scheme. 
 
5.6. 'Greening' of the CAP (Reform V) 
The reformed CAP imposes a stronger linkage of decoupled payments to “agricultural 
practices beneficial to the climate and environment” (the-so-called 'CAP greening'). The 
conditions are similar to cross compliance but more demanding than the cross-compliance 
requirements. Not respecting these requirements may lead to a reduction or a full loss of the 
SPS. Conceptually, the CAP 'greening' has similar implications for land markets as the cross-
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 Visually Figure 4 shows a large increase of entitlements (an increase from AE
T
 to AE
N
). However, this is only 
for illustrative purposes to reduce the complexity of the analysis. However, the results hold in general. In reality 
the increase in the number of entitlements will be likely smaller than visually apparent on the figure implying 
that AE
N
 will be close to A1
N
 in region 1 and AE
N
 will be close to A2
N
 in region 2. 
25
 Analogously, if entitlement stock decreases in region 1, which is a less likely situation, the land use and land 
rents will increase. 
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compliance – a likely decline in land rents. An increase in environmental requirements will 
increase the costs for farmers, thus reduce profits from land use and hence reduce the demand 
for land. This, in turn, will lead to a reduction in the land use and a decline of land rents.  
As already mentioned, the CAP 'greening' includes three measures: the crop 
diversification, the maintenance of permanent grassland and ecological focus area (set-aside). 
The 'greening' requirements may reduce land productivity, because they constrain farms with 
respect to the crop choice and the use of land. In the case of the crop diversification 
requirement, farms may be required to relocate land between crops, if they do not cultivate 
the required number of different crops, and if the maximum planting thresholds are not 
respected. Farms may need to cultivate a higher share of a less profitable crop to fulfil the 
crop diversification requirement. This would lead to a reduction of land profitability, and 
hence in lower farm bids for land rent. The implications of the permanent grassland 
requirement are similar. If it would be optimal for farm to convert grassland to other uses in 
the absence of the CAP greening, but the 'greening' requirement would constrain the farm 
from doing so, it may cause a downward shift in the land profitability. The ecological focus 
area requires farms withdrawing some land from production, which reduces returns from 
farming.  
Reform V is illustrated in Figure 5 for the SPS with deficit entitlements.
26
 Distance c 
represents the per hectare productivity reduction induced by the 'greening' requirements, it is 
assumed to be constant. The productivity reduction c shifts the land demand curve with 
entitlement rt  downward from DrD to DcDc. The equilibrium shifts from (A
*
 r
*
) to (Ac
*
 rc
*
). 
'Greening' thus reduces the land use (by A
*
 - Ac
*
) and the rental price (by r
*
 - rc
*
).  
The evidence shows that the CAP ‘greening’ effects differ significantly between 
farms and regions due to the existing heterogeneity in farms' production structure, 
specialization, geographical location and technology. Some farms do not need to adjust to 
‘greening’ requirements. This is the case, for example, if their production structure is already 
sufficiently diversified, if they have no incentive to convert grassland to other uses, or if they 
possess strips of land economically not suitable for production. For some other farms, in 
particular those specialized in growing a single crop without fallow land, an adjustment in 
production structure is required. This implies, that the ’greening’ impact will vary between 
the MS, regions and farms (Louhichi et al. 2015; Solazzo et al. 2014; Cimino, Henke and 
Vanni 2015).
27
 At the aggregate MS or regional level, the existing evidence shows that the 
impact of the CAP greening on the farm performance (productivity, income) – on c as shown 
in Figure 5 – is rather small (Louhichi et al. 2015; Was et al. 2014; Solazzo and Pierangeli 
2015). Further, the evidence suggests that the impact of CAP greening may actually induce 
small income increase at the aggregate MS or the regional level, if a positive output price 
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 Similar intuition holds for SAPS. 
27
 This also implies that the productivity reduction, c, may not be constant as assumed in Figure 5 but may 
change (increase or decrease) with land use. 
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feedback is taken into account.
28
 The farm income may increase because the CAP greening 
leads to a productivity decline which in turn reduces production level causing higher output 
prices (Gocht et al. 2015). Overall, the evidence from the previous literature implies that the 
impact of the CAP greening on the decoupled payment capitalization will likely be minimal, 
as the productivity decline may be partially or fully offset by an output price increase and 
thus difficult to be detected and measured in practice. 
 
6. Estimation of the capitalization effects of the reform  
In this section we aim to quantify the capitalization effects of the 2013 CAP reform in land 
rental prices, as well as we decompose the contribution of each reform element to the total 
post-reform capitalization level. The capitalization effects are quantified by MS by taking 
into account the variation of the actual implementation of the reform. Note that the size of the 
effects quantified in this section is indicative and should be interpreted with care, as there are 
insufficient data to econometrically estimate the actual impact of the reform. The results 
presented in this section indicate the potential direction of the capitalization change and 
provide the expected pressure that the reform may induce on the EU land markets. 
 
6.1. Methodology 
We estimate the capitalization of decoupled payments into land rental prices for both the pre-
reform period and the post-reform implementation. Alongside providing the total 
capitalization effects, this approach allows us to quantify the change in capitalization caused 
by the CAP reform. To derive the post-reform capitalization we consider all reform elements 
as discussed in section 5, with the exception of the CAP greening. The main motivation for 
excluding the CAP greening is that its impact on the agricultural market (production and 
income) is found to be rather small in the literature (e.g. Louhichi et al. 2015; Gocht et al. 
2015; Was et al. 2014; Solazzo and Pierangeli 2015), and thus it is expected to have an 
insignificant impact on land markets. Consistent with the conceptual model of the previous 
section, we consider full adjustment of land markets to the decoupled payment changes. 
In section 5 we have shown that the SPS is capitalized in land rents if entitlements are 
in surplus relative to the eligible area. For the SAPS there are no entitlements and the entire 
farmland area is eligible for receiving payments, implying that at the margin it always affects 
land rents. In both cases the capitalization level is determined by the marginal entitlement 
value.  
Literature suggests that the capitalization of decoupled payments is strongly 
determined by land demand and supply elasticities (Floyd 1965; Guyomard et al. 2004; 
Ciaian and Kancs 2012). Following our conceptual model, the capitalization formula for the 
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 Note that our conceptual analysis showed in Figure 5 assumes fixed output prices. 
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pre-reform period (indexed with O) for the SAPS or for the SPS, if entitlements are in 
surplus, A
T
 ≥ A*, can be derived as follows (see Appendix 1):  
(1) 
D
m m
S D
av av avO
t tr
K
t t t
   for SAPS or for SPS if A
T
 ≥ A* 
where tm is the marginal value of the decoupled payment, tac is the average value of the 
decoupled payment, S  and 
D  are the land supply and land demand elasticities, respectively, 
with   S S r r S     and   D D r r D    , and K is the capitalization parameter 
which determines how much one Euro of decoupled payments is capitalized into land rental 
prices, ( )D S DK . 
Equation (1) estimates the average pre-reform capitalization rate of decoupled 
payments for the SAPS or for the SPS if entitlements are in surplus. It indicates how much 
(% share) one Euro of decoupled payments is reflected in higher rental prices. The average 
capitalization rate decreases with land supply elasticity and increases with land demand 
elasticity. For example, in an extreme situation with fully inelastic land supply, 0S  , the 
marginal decoupled payment is fully capitalized in land rents, i.e. K = 1.  
Note that to derive the average capitalization rate with equation (1), one needs to 
consider the marginal value of decoupled payments, if decoupled payments vary across 
farms. For example, for the historical SPS model shown in Figure 3, the marginal entitlement 
value is equal to t
2
, tm = t
2
, whereas for the flat-rate SPS model shown in Figure 3, the 
marginal entitlement value is equal to the average payment value t
r
, tm = tav = t
r
. Similar to the 
regional SPS model, for the SAPS the marginal payment value is equal to the average 
payment value. 
The capitalization formula for the 2013 CAP reform (indexed with N) can be derived 
as follows (see Appendix 1): 
(2) 
I II III IV
m m m m
av av av av avN
t t t tr
K
t t t t t
  for SAPS or for SPS if A
T
 ≥ A* 
where Δtm
I
, Δtm
II
, Δtm
III
 and Δtm
IV
 are changes in the marginal value of decoupled payments 
due to the first, the second, the third and the fourth reform elements, respectively.  
 Equation (2) decomposes the contribution of the individual reform elements in the 
total change of the average capitalization rate for the SAPS or for the SPS, if entitlements are 
in surplus. We use the pre-reform capitalization formula (1) and the post-reform 
capitalization formula (2) to quantify the total post-reform capitalization rate as well as the 
relative importance of the different reform elements in the general post-reform average 
capitalization rate (see Appendix 1). 
The expected SPS capitalization rate for the case of deficit entitlements is zero: 
0avr t   . This follows form the conceptual model illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The 
SPS has a zero-distortive marginal effect on farm rental decisions when there are insufficient 
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entitlements relative to eligible area. This result is not affected by the SPS model applied in 
the pre-reform period (e.g. historical, hybrid or regional models) or by the four reform 
elements, as long as the stock of entitlements remain in deficit relative to the eligible area. 
 
6.2. Data and variable construction 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the budgetary allocation of direct payments and the 
implementation of decoupled payments before and after the reform. This information is used 
for the quantification of capitalization effects derived in equations (1) and (2). For the 2013 
CAP reform we consider decoupled payments as implemented in 2019, as this reflects the 
final situation when the full adoption of the CAP reform takes place. For the pre-reform 
situation we consider the year 2013, which is the last year when the pre-reform CAP system 
was in place. 
According to the data reported in Table 6, the total EU-27 CAP budget allocated to 
direct payments in 2019 represents 41.5 billion Euro, decreasing by 8% relative to 2013.
29
 
Note that direct payments include both coupled and decoupled payments. The budget for 
decoupled payments decreased less for EU-27 level (by 4%) over the same period indicating 
that the relative importance of decoupled payments compared to coupled payments increased 
in the total direct payment envelope. At the MS level, the decoupled payments' budget 
increases in many NMS (with exception of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta and Slovenia) 
in 2019 relative to 2013. In contrast in most OMS the decoupled payment budget reduces; the 
exceptions are Austria and Portugal. This change in decoupled payment budget between 2013 
and 2019 is caused by the combination of four factors: the external convergence, the 
relocation of the direct payment budget between coupled and decoupled subsidies, the 
transfer of resources between direct payments and other CAP items (RDP) and the overall 
CAP budget reduction. OMS have higher payments per hectare than NMS, as a result of 
which the implementation of the external convergence tends to decrease payments in former 
countries to the benefit of latter countries. Other main reason for the observed divergent 
development of decoupled payment budget is that many NMS transfer resources from other 
CAP items (RDP) to the direct payment envelope, whereas several OMS do the reverse. 
Finally, the decoupled payment budget also reduces, because of the overall CAP budget cut. 
Table 7 reveals that in general, MS implementing a hybrid SPS model before the 
reform introduced the flat-rate SPS system in the post-reform period, while MS implementing 
the historical SPS model opted to keep differences in decoupled payments among farms by 
implementing a partial convergence. Overall, out of 18 MS implementing the SPS before the 
reform, four countries apply a flat-rate (either at the regional or the national level) starting 
from 2015 (Fance-Corsica, Malta, UK- England), five gradually introduce a flat-rate by 2019 
or 2020 (Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and UK - Scotland and Wales), whereas 
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 Note that the direct payments for EU-28 decreased less (7%) because Croatia is not accounted in the 2013 
data  as it was not EU member country, whereas it is included in the 2019 data. 
 29 
 
the rest of these MS (14) apply a partial convergence by 2019. Member States that applied 
the SAPS before the reform continue to apply the SAPS, which is a flat-rate area payment 
scheme and does not require adoption of the internal convergence. Also Germany,
30
 Malta, 
and UK-England had a flat-rate SPS system before the reform and thus these countries are 
also not concerned by internal convergence. In contrast, Slovenia had a flat rate payment 
before the 2013 CAP reform, while after the reform payments are differentiated across farms 
(European Commission 2015).  
In total, nine Member States implement the redistributive payment: Belgium 
(Wallonia only), Bulgaria, France, Germany, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and UK 
(Wales), accounting from 5% of the direct payment budget in Romania to 20% in France. 
The maximum area per farm receiving the redistributive payment varies between 20 hectares 
in Croatia to 54 hectares in UK-Wales (Table 7). 
Most MS adopted an entitlement allocation mechanism under which they replace old 
entitlements with new ones. Only four MS decided to maintain the exiting (old) entitlements. 
Additionally, Austria and UK-Scotland have applied a reduction coefficient to permanent 
grassland (1 hectare of permanent grassland gives right to 0.2 entitlements in Austria and 0.9 
in UK-Scotland) (Table 7). 
The numbers of activated entitlements in the pre-reform period (2013) are available 
from the European Commission and are reported in Table 8. The eligible area for 2013 is also 
available from European Commission and is calculated based on a combination of CATS-
database data (DG-AGRI) and Farm Structure Survey (FSS) data. For the post-reform period, 
the eligible area is calculated based on the eligible area in 2013 by adding (deducting) areas 
made eligible (ineligible) under the reform (e.g. vineyards in France and greenhouses in the 
Netherlands and Greece were made ineligible). To obtain the post-reform SPS entitlements, 
first we calculate the ratio of entitlements to the eligible area-based on the 2012 FADN data 
and then multiply this ratio with the eligible area in post-reform period to obtain the number 
of entitlements.  
We use the ratio of entitlements to eligible area to determine whether the SPS impacts 
land rents at the margin. MS with activated entitlements equal or higher (lower) than 97% of 
eligible area where assumed to have surplus (deficit) entitlements
31
 representing the situation 
when the SPS impacts (does not impact) the land market.
32
 This threshold is used to derive 
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 Germany implemented the hybrid SPS model at the regional level in the pre-reform period, whereas in the 
post-reform period it implements the flat-rate SPS model at the national level. Note that this change in the SPS 
implementation from regional to national is not taken into account in our estimations, as we conduct a country 
level analysis and not at the regional level. 
31
 The main reason for considering 97% instead of 100% threshold is that the available data on entitlements for 
calculating this ratio was based on the activated (used) entitlements and not on the total disbursed entitlements 
which may underestimate their total stock as some of them might be unused. 
32
 This assumption is partially supported by empirical studies estimating the capitalization of the pre-reform 
SPS. Although conclusive evidence cannot be derived from the available empirical studies, the empirical studies 
tend to find a higher capitalization rate in regions with surplus entitlements compared to regions with deficit 
entitlements of the pre-reform SPS. For example, Johansson and Nilsson (2012) analyze the SPS impacts in 
Sweden, and Kilian et al. (2012) analyze the SPS impacts in Bavaria (Germany) and find a comparably high 
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the mean (central) average capitalization rates of decoupled payments. We consider lower 
and upper variation between ±2% of this threshold to account for the uncertainty in the 
underlying data
33
 and which will determine the interval within which the capitalization rate 
may vary.  
Key parameters required to quantify the capitalization rate as defined by equations (1) 
and (2) are marginal and average values of decoupled payments. The average payment value 
is obtained by dividing the total decoupled envelope reported in Table 6 by the number of 
entitlements for the SPS and by the total eligible area for the SAPS. As Table 8 shows, the 
average payment value in the pre-reform period (2013) varies between 73 Euro/ha and 713 
Euro/ha. In the post-reform period (2019) the variation decreases to between 128 Euro/ha and 
366 Euro/ha.  
 The marginal payment values are calculated first for Reform IV and then are 
consecutively adjusted in line with Reforms I, II and III (Table 8).
34
 The marginal payment 
value of the entitlement stock change effect (Reform IV) is set to the pre-reform marginal 
decoupled payment value adjusted by the change in the stock of entitlements for the SPS (i.e. 
by keeping the decoupled payment budget unchanged at the pre-reform level, while changing 
the stock of entitlements caused by the reform). The marginal payment value for the budget 
change effect (Reform I) is obtained by adjusting the marginal payment value of Reform IV 
by the rate of change of the decoupled payment budget in 2019 relative to 2013 reported in 
Table 6. MS that a have lower decoupled payment envelope in 2019 than in 2013 experience 
a reduction in the marginal payment value due to Reform I, whereas the reverse is observed 
for MS with a budget increase. The marginal payment value for the internal convergence 
effect (Reform II) is obtained by adjusting the marginal payment value of Reform I by setting 
it to the 2019 average decoupled payment value for the SAPS and for the flat-rate SPS model. 
For the SPS model with heterogeneous payments across farms, the marginal payments for 
Reform II are calculated based on FADN data for 2012. For the pre-reform period we use the 
distribution of decoupled payments across farms as available in the actual 2012 FADN data. 
For the CAP reform, we calculate new decoupled payments following the EU regulation (EU 
2013). Then, to obtain the marginal value (for both the pre-reform and the post-reform 
period), we take the average decoupled payment value of 2% of farms with lowest payment 
values. Finally, the marginal payment value for the differentiation of the payments effect 
(Reform III) is obtained by adjusting downward the marginal payment value of Reform II by 
the relative share of redistributive payments in the total value of decoupled payments. 
                                                                                                                                                        
capitalization rate. In contrast, Michalek, Ciaian, and Kancs (2014) find that the capitalization rate is lower in 
those regions, where the entitlement/UAA ratio is lower. Similarly, Guastella et al. (2014) find a statistically 
insignificant impact of the SPS on land rents in Italy, which has deficit entitlements. 
33
 Note that the derived capitalization rate is inversely correlated with the threshold level.  
34
 Note that if the order of the marginal payment values calculation changes, the contribution of the different 
reform elements may change. The key determinant of the capitalization is the stock of entitlements relative to 
the eligible area. Changing the order of this element will change the contribution of the other reform elements. 
However, the overall capitalization rate will not be altered. 
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Following the conceptual analysis, this consideration assumes that the redistributive payment 
is financed proportionally by reducing decoupled payments across all farms, while farms 
receive a top-up redistributive payment which does not affect marginal decoupled payment as 
depicted in Figure 3. Note that, following the conceptual analysis, the marginal values in 
Table 8 always affect land rents for the SAPS, whereas for the SPS only if entitlements are 
sufficient (above 97% or ±2% variation around this central value) relative to the eligible land.  
Finally, to derive the capitalization parameter, K, in equations (1) and (2), land supply 
and demand elasticities are extracted from the literature. We use central values of elasticities 
to derive the mean (central) average capitalization rates of decoupled payments. We also 
extract lower and upper values of elasticities form the literature to indicate the interval within 
which the capitalization may vary. This accounts for the fact that land availability and land 
demand behavior may vary across EU regions. In empirical studies, land supply elasticities, 
S, are usually found to be rather low, mostly owing to natural constraints. The most 
commonly estimated values of output supply elasticities are between 0.1 and 0.6 (e.g., 
Salhofer 2001; Abler 2001). Based on an extensive literature review, Salhofer (2001) 
concludes that a plausible range of land supply elasticity for the EU is between 0.1 and 0.4. 
Similarly, Abler (2001) finds a plausible range between 0.2 and 0.6 for the US, Canada and 
Mexico. Following Salhofer (2001) we use the central estimate of land supply elasticity of 
0.25, and the lower and upper bounds at 0.1 and 0.4, respectively. We use central estimate of 
land demand elasticities, D, of -0.875 with a variation between -0.8 and -0.95 (see Appendix 
2). 
 
6.3. Results 
Table 9 and Table 10 report the results for the capitalization effects of the 2013 CAP reform. 
As mentioned above, the estimated magnitudes of the effects are indicative and should be 
interpreted with care, as there are insufficient data to econometrically estimate the actual size 
of the effects. Table 9 reports the capitalization rate. Columns 2-4 show the pre-reform 
capitalization rate of decoupled payments by providing average (central) estimates as well as 
an uncertainty interval which provides the lower and upper bounds of the estimates. Columns 
5 to 7 summarize the expected capitalization of the 2013 CAP reform. Table 10 shows the 
decomposition of capitalization sources of the 2013 CAP reform
35
 accounting in column 2-4 
for the contribution of the pre-reform capitalization, in columns 5-7 for the entitlement stock 
change (Reform IV), in columns 8-10 for the total budget change (Reform I), in columns 11-
13 for the internal convergence of payments (Reform II) and in columns 14-16 for the 
differentiation of payments (Reform III). 
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 Croatia is not considered in the decomposition of the post-reform capitalization effects as it was not part of 
the EU in the pre-reform period and thus we do not have a counterfactual pre-reform situation for the decoupled 
payment implementation. 
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The first major observation arising from Table 9 is that the capitalization rate of 
decoupled payments is affected by the 2013 CAP reform vis–à–vis the pre-reform period. At 
the EU level, the reform increases the central value of the capitalization rate from 31% to 
47%. The lower and upper bounds (i.e. the uncertainty interval) of the average capitalization 
rate in the pre-reform period is between 15% and 43% increasing to between 40% and 55% in 
the post-reform period. These results imply that the CAP reform causes the rental price of 
farmland to increase by additional 16 euro cents spent on decoupled payments relative to the 
pre-reform situation with lower and upper bounds being 11 cents and 25 cents, respectively. 
 The main source of post-reform capitalization in EU reported in Table 10 is the pre-
reform capitalization accounting for 69% of the total post-reform capitalization, followed by 
the entitlement stock change (Reform IV) with 19%, internal convergence (Reform II) with 
18%, the budget change (Reform I) with 1%, whereas the differentiation of payments 
(Reform III) contributes to the reduction of the post-reform capitalization by accounting for -
7% of the total post-reform capitalization rate. The uncertainty analyses show that the 
contribution of the pre-reform capitalization and the entitlement stock change (Reform IV) 
may vary significantly 39%- 85% and 3%-49%, respectively). This variation is caused by the 
±2% threshold used for determining when the entitlement stock relative to the eligible area is 
large enough so that SPS affects willingness to pay for land renting at the margin. Because 
the pre-reform capitalization and the post-reform capitalization caused by the entitlement 
stock change (Reform IV) are inversely correlated, they change considerably and in an 
opposite direction when altering this threshold. 
Our results suggest a significant difference in the capitalization rate between NMS 
and OMS. The capitalization rate is higher in NMS than in OMS in both the pre- and post-
reform periods: 76%-72% in NMS versus 20%-39% in OMS (Table 9, Figure 6). This is 
because most MS implement the SAPS which, according to our conceptual analysis, has a 
stronger impact on land rents than the SPS. Our estimated capitalization rate for NMS is 
higher than the empirically estimated in Ciaian and Kancs (2012) and Van Herck, Swinnen 
and Vranken (2013). However, these studies base their estimations on the data from the first 
years of the SAPS implementation, when the effects might have not fully materialized yet 
due to land market rigidities (e.g. long duration of rental contracts). Our estimated 
capitalization rate for OMS are largely in line with the literature which tends to find a lower 
capitalization of the SPS, although, with some heterogeneity across MS (e.g. Michalek, 
Ciaian and Kancs 2014; Feichtinger and Salhofer 2015a; O’Neill and Hanrahan 2016).  
A further important difference between NMS and OMS is that the reform slightly 
reduces the capitalization rate in NMS, whereas it increases in OMS. In NMS the central 
value of the capitalization rate reduces from 76% in the pre-reform period to 72% in the post-
reform period. In OMS the central rate almost doubles from 20% to 39% (Figure 6). The 
main reason for this difference in the reform effects is that most NMS have the SAPS in place 
in both periods which exerts a strong impact on land markets. This is reflected in the fact that 
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the main source of the post-reform capitalization is the pre-reform capitalization accounting 
for 91% of the total post-reform capitalization, whereas the 2013 CAP reform accounts only 
for 9%. These figures imply that the changes introduced to decoupled payments by the 
reform in NMS do not significantly alter incentives on the land market and keep the 
capitalization level largely unchanged. In OMS the pre-reform capitalization accounts 
significantly less (56%) of the total post-reform capitalization, whereas the reform captures 
the remaining 44% of the post-reform capitalization rate. The uncertainty analyses show that 
the reform contribution to the total post-reform capitalization vary between 20% and 90%. 
This variation is driven by the entitlement stock change (Reform IV) which varies between 
3% and 75%, as it is inversely correlated with the contribution of the pre-reform 
capitalization. The most important reform element causing the increase in the capitalization 
in OMS is the internal convergence (Reform II), 29%, followed by the entitlement stock 
change (Reform IV), 28%. Most OMS allocate new entitlements, which leads to an expansion 
of the stock of entitlements relative to the eligible area which turns many OMS with a zero 
capitalization rate in the pre-reform period to a positive capitalization in the post-reform 
period. However, as indicated above the uncertainty analyses suggest that the contribution of 
Reform IV may vary between 3% and 75%. The internal convergence increases payments at 
the margin, inducing an upward pressure on land rents. The other two reform elements 
(Reforms I and III) reduce the capitalization rate in OMS (by -5% and -8%, respectively), but 
they do not offset the effects of the latter two reforms (Reforms II and IV) (Table 10, Figure 
7). 
As expected, the budget change (Reform I) increases capitalization in NMS (11%) 
while it decreases in OMS (-5%) (Table 10). As explained above, this is caused by external 
convergence, which aims to partially harmonize payments across MS. Given that OMS have 
higher payments per hectare than NMS, the external convergence decreases payments in 
OMS to the benefit of NMS. Another important reason for the observed divergent 
development of the decoupled payment budget is that many NMS transfer resources from 
other CAP items (RDP) to the direct payment envelope, whereas several OMS do the reverse. 
These changes expand payment values in NMS and contract them in OMS. Further, as 
expected the entitlement stock change (Reform IV) and the internal convergence (Reform II) 
contribute minimally to the post-reform capitalization in NMS in contrast to OMS. This is 
because most NSM implement the SAPS, which is a flat-rate payment scheme without 
entitlements. Hence, these two reforms do not concern these countries (Table 10).
36
  
The strongest increase in the capitalization rate occurs in MS which allocated new 
entitlements (Reform IV) in the post-reform period (Table 9). This includes MS 
implementing the historical SPS model in OMS and the regional SPS model in NMS in pre-
reform period. The main explanation for this result is that these MS had deficit enlistments 
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 This two reforms elements concern only Croatia, Malta and Slovenia which are the only three NMS 
implementing the SPS. 
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relative to the eligible area in the pre-reform period which implies a zero capitalization. 
Allocation of new entitlements led to their expansion relative to the eligible area, given that 
their allocation is based on the land use in the first year of the reform implementation. The 
post-reform stock of entitlements become approximately equal to total eligible land use (i.e. 
with optimal land use), which leads to a stronger land competition, as land is needed for the 
activation of entitlements and thus induces the SPS to raise land rents in these MS. This 
entitlement stock effect (Reform IV) causes the capitalization to increase from zero in the 
pre-reform period to a positive capitalization in the post-reform period. The exceptions are 
Austria and Spain, where the capitalization is zero in both pre- and post- reform periods. 
Austria has applied a reduction coefficient to the permanent grassland. Spain limited the 
allocated entitlements to the minimum between the eligible area in 2013 and the declared 
eligible area in 2015, as well as there are no extension of eligible farms (i.e. entitlements 
were allocated in the post reform-period only to those farms which were eligible to receive 
direct payments in 2013). Both these implementation details reduced the stock of entitlements 
relative to the eligible area and thus reduced the pressure of decoupled payments on the land 
market.
37
  
For most MS which implemented the hybrid SPS model in the pre-reform period, the 
capitalization effect was positive in the pre-reform period, hence the entitlement stock effect 
(Reform IV) has a minimal impact in the post-reform period even though most of these MS 
keep the old entitlements. The exceptions are Luxemburg and UK (Table 9). These two 
countries had a zero central value of the capitalization rate in the pre-reform period, while the 
allocation of new entitlements (in Wales and Northern Ireland in UK) based on the land area 
in the first year of the reform implantation caused expansion of entitlements and a positive 
central capitalization rate in the post-reform period. Note that even though the pre-reform 
central capitalization rate is zero in these two MS, the upper bound of the capitalization rate 
is positive at 27% in Luxemburg and 90% in UK suggesting that the change obtained for the 
central rate in the post-reform period might be lower. 
The internal convergence (Reform II) contributes significantly to the post-reform 
capitalization, particularly in MS with the historical SPS model in the pre-reform period 
(Belgium, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal) and in MS with the hybrid 
SPS model in the pre-reform period that fully harmonized payments across farms in the post-
reform period (Finland) (Table 10). The internal convergence increases payment values at the 
margin which causes a greater share of payments being reflected in higher rental prices. 
However, the highest post-reform capitalization rate is observed in MS that have introduced a 
full convergence or have a flat-rate payment scheme (i.e. in Germany, Finland, the 
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 Note that similar to Spain, Ireland and Portugal have also limited the allocated entitlements to the minimum 
between the eligible area in 2013 and the declared eligible area in 2015. However, no significant changes in land 
use took place between 2013 and 2015 implying that allocation of new entitlement caused that the stock of 
entitlement correspond to eligible area in post-reform period. 
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Netherlands, Sweden, UK, NMS with the SAPS), whereas MS that have partially harmonized 
decoupled payments (those with partial convergence) have a significantly lower capitalization 
level. This is because the former MS have greater relative value of the per hectare marginal 
payments (relative to the average per hectare payment) than the latter MS causing a higher 
capitalization level.  
As expected, the differentiation of payments (Reform III) leads to a reduction of 
capitalization in all MS that implement it and have a positive capitalization rate (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, UK). Its importance in the total 
post-reform capitalization rate varies between -7% and -31% across MS (Table 10). 
All NMS implementing the SAPS have a relatively high capitalization rate before and 
after the reform. This is because of the nature of the SAPS under which all eligible area 
receives payments and thus exercises a strong upward pressure on land rents in both periods 
(Table 9). This explains why the contribution of the pre-reform capitalization is by far the 
most important source of the post-reform capitalization in NMS. In the pre-reform period the 
central value of the capitalization rate is 78% in all NMS implementing the SAPS. In the 
post-reform period it decreases only in four NMS (to 72% in Bulgaria, 64% in Lithuania, 
70% in Poland and 73% in Romania), while in the rest of NMS it stays unchanged. The 
reduction in the capitalization rate occurs in NMS implementing the differentiation of 
payments (Reform III), because this reform element reduces the value of marginal payments 
and introduces some SAPS heterogeneity across farms (Table 9, Table 10).  
The impact of the budget change (Reform I) is heterogeneous among MS depending 
on the direction and magnitude of the decoupled payment envelope change. However, in 
most NMS Reform I contributes positively to the post-reform capitalization, given that the 
decoupled payments' budget increases in many NMS between 2013 and 2019. In contrast, in 
most OMS the decoupled payment budget reduces; hence the contribution of the Reform I to 
the post-reform capitalization tends to be negative. The contribution of Reform I to the post-
reform capitalization varies between -13% and 2% in OMS. In NMS its contribution is 
greater by varying between -137% and 43% (Table 10). 
  
Non-farming land owners' policy gains 
Based on the estimated capitalization rates in Table 9 and using the FADN data on land 
renting, we can calculate the non-farming landowner gains from decoupled payments in pre- 
and post-reform periods for every MS as well as aggregated for NMS, OMS and the EU. In 
this exercise we assume that the share of the rented farmland in the post-reform period (2013) 
is the same as in the pre-reform period. The results are reported in Table 11 showing central 
values as well as lower and upper bounds. The capitalization rate reported in Table 9 
represents the subsidy gain for all landowners (both for farming and non-farming), whereas 
non-farming landowner gains in Table 11 represent policy benefits only for those 
landowners, who are not involved in farming.  
 36 
 
On average, 25% of decoupled payments are channeled to non-farming landowners 
through higher rental prices in the EU in the post-reform period, increasing from 17% in the 
pre-reform period (Table 11, Figure 8). This non-farming landowners' capitalization rate is 
54% of the capitalization rate reported in Table 9. Given that the land renting rate is around 
half of the used land in both NMS and OMS, the non-farming landowners gains are roughly 
half of the capitalization rate reported in Table 9 and Figure 8 at 39% and 21%, respectively, 
in the post-reform period, changing form 41% and 11%, respectively, in the pre-reform 
period. 
The highest post-reform leakages of decoupled payments to non-farming landowners 
are in Slovakia, Malta, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, where non-farming landowners gain 
between 60% and 73% of the total decoupled payment value. These MS have a high share of 
land renting as well have in place flat-rate payment scheme. They are followed by Estonia, 
Cyprus, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania and UK, 
where between 30% and 60% of decoupled payments flow to non-farming landowners. These 
countries have sizable land renting and similar to the first group of countries (with the 
exception of Croatia), have implemented a flat-rate payment scheme. In Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia 
the leakages are between 6%and 30% of the total decoupled payment value. These MS have 
either small land renting (e.g. Poland; Finland), have heterogeneous payments (have adopted 
partial convergence of payments) (e.g. Belgium, France), or have combination of both factors 
(e.g. Ireland, Portugal). In the rest of the courtiers (Austria, Spain), non-farming landowners 
have zero post-reform gains because of a zero capitalization rate (Table 11). 
 
7. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the 2013 CAP reform on the decoupled 
payment capitalization into land values in the EU. Compared to previous studies, we account 
for the actual implementation of the CAP reform across MS and decompose the contribution 
of different reform elements to the total post-reform capitalization level. We consider the key 
reform elements that may impact incentives on land markets and thus cause changes in the 
capitalization level, including the harmonization of payments between farms (internal 
convergence), the differentiation in per hectare payments (redistributive payment), changes in 
the reference period for entitlement allocation, budgetary changes and the partial 
harmonization of payments across MS (external convergence), and the CAP greening. 
Our results suggest that, on average in the EU, the reform leads to a 47% 
capitalization rate of decoupled payments into land rents increasing from 31% in the pre-
reform period. These results imply that the reform causes land rental prices to increase by 
additional 16 cents for each EUR of decoupled payments relative to the pre-reform situation. 
Our results suggest a significant difference in the impact of the CAP reform in NMS and 
OMS. The reform slightly reduces the capitalization rate in NMS, whereas it increases in 
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OMS. In NMS the capitalization rate slightly reduces from 76% in the pre-reform period to 
72% in the post-reform period. Although the capitalization rate is significantly lower in 
OMS, it almost doubles due to the reform: from 20% to 39%. The main reason for this 
difference is that decoupled payments are capitalized in NMS already in the pre-reform 
period, as most of NMS countries implement the SAPS which exerts a stronger pressure on 
the land market than the SPS implemented in OMS. 
The main source of the post-reform capitalization in the EU is the pre-reform 
capitalization accounting for 69% of the total post-reform capitalization, followed by the 
entitlement stock change with 19%, the internal convergence with 18%, the budget change 
with 1%, and the differentiation of payments with -7%. Again, there is a significant 
difference between NMS and OMS. Because decoupled payments were capitalized in NMS 
already in the pre-reform period, the pre-reform capitalization accounts as much as 91% of 
the total post-reform capitalization in these countries. The reform only marginally impacts 
land rents; it explains 9% of the total post-reform capitalization. In contrast, in OMS the 
reform causes 45% of the total post-reform capitalization with the largest drivers being the 
internal convergence (29%) and the entitlement stock change (28%). The other two reform 
elements - the differentiation of payments and the budget change - reduce the post-reform 
capitalization in OMS but are of much smaller importance - accounting for -8% and -5%, 
respectively, of the total post-reform capitalization.  
Based on the estimated capitalization rate and the FADN data on the share of rented 
land, we have calculated the non-farming landowners' gains from decoupled payments. On 
average, 25% of decoupled payments are channeled to non-farming landowners in the EU in 
the post-reform period, increasing from 17% in the pre-reform period. The same figures for 
NMS and OMS are 39% and 21%, respectively, in the post-reform period changing form 
41% and 11%, respectively, in the pre-reform period. These results suggest a relatively small 
to moderate leakage rate of decoupled payments to non-farming landowners. In 2019, the 
total value of the decoupled payment budget represents around €37 billion in the EU. If we 
consider a 25% leakage rate of decoupled payments to non-farming landowners (Table 11), 
around €9.3 billion per year are expected to be channeled outside the farming sector in the 
EU in the post-reform period of which €3.2 billion is caused by the reform, whereas the rest, 
€5.1 billion, is due to the pre-reform capitalization.  
Despite the comprehensiveness of the analysis, one should interpret the results 
reported in this paper with care, as there are several factors that do not allow predicting 
capitalization effects with the desired accuracy. This paper provides theoretical effects that 
the reform may induce on the EU land markets; the actual impact will depend on many other 
factors. First, we have assume a full land market adjustment to the 2013 CAP reform, which 
in reality may not hold in the short-run, and the rental price response may take longer time 
due to various land market imperfections and rigidities. Second, although we have attempted 
to account for uncertainties in our approach by providing lower and upper bounds of 
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capitalization estimates, the reform effects might be even more complex and might be co-
determined by local factors and regional land market characteristics. This implies that 
capitalization effects of the CAP reform may differ not only between MS, but also across 
regions within a MS. Third, we have assumed a full tradability of the SPS entitlements in our 
analysis. In reality, the entitlement tradability might be constrained due to market 
imperfections or a policy risk, and thus alter the estimated capitalization level. A conceptual 
analysis of Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen (2008) has shown that in such a situation the 
capitalization level of the SPS might be higher compared to a full tradability as assumed in 
this paper. Fifth, in our analysis we have not taken into account the pressure on the 
capitalization level coming from new entrants into the agricultural sector. MS can create a 
reserve of up to 3% of the decoupled payment envelope, where priority for the allocation of 
entitlements is given to young farmers and new entrants. This effect may enhance the 
capitalization effect but it depends on its magnitude and frequency of use. Sixth, land prices 
are strongly impacted by commodity price developments and thus when conducting empirical 
analyses they need to be controlled for otherwise they may confound with the CAP reform 
impacts. Finally, decoupled payments are subject to future adjustments and reforms, implying 
that the capitalization of the 2013 CAP reform will also depend on the perception of farms 
and landowners about certainty and stability of the new legislation in the medium to long-run. 
Despite these limitations, the paper shows the potential implications of the 2013 CAP reform 
and in particular it indicates the pressures that it may generate on land markets in the EU. 
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Figure 1. Development in land prices in EU (EUR/ha) 
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Figure 2. The effect of the SPS harmonization between MS 
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Figure 3. The effect of the SPS with surplus and deficit entitlements 
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Figure 4. The effect of the reference period 
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Figure 5. The effect of CAP 'greening' 
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Figure 6. Estimated decoupled payments capitalization rates in NMS, OMS and EU 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Sources of the 2013 CAP reform capitalization in NMS, OMS and EU 
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Figure 8. Non-farming land owners' gains from the decoupled payments in NMS, OMS 
and EU 
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Table 1. Agricultural land sales as a percentage of the total utilized agricultural area 
 
 Old member states 
1998 2006 
Belgium 1.63 1.28* 
Finland 1.79 2.72 
France 1.03 0.99* 
Germany 0.58 0.58 
Greece 0.41 0.35* 
Ireland 3.04 2.90 
Italy 1.60 1.42* 
Netherlands 3.72 3.08 
Spain 0.52 0.62 
Sweden 0.63 0.62 
UK 3.60 1.64* 
 New member states 
 1998–2001** 2005–2006** 
Bulgaria 0.34 1.61 
Czech Republic 2.8 3.30* 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 
Hungary n.a. 3.6 
Latvia n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania 1.9 8.4 
Poland 1.71 1.77 
Romania 0.2 0.43 
Slovakia 0.1 0.14 
* Data from 2004 
**Bulgaria: data for 1999 and 2006; Czech Republic: data for 1998 and 2005; Estonia: data for 2005, 
transacted arable land as a percentage of UAA; Hungary: data for 2006; Lithuania: number of sales and gifts, 
data for 2000 and 2006; Poland: data for 1998 and 2005; Romania: data for 1999 and 2005; Slovakia: data for 
2001 and 2005 
Sources: Ciaian et al. (2010); Swinnen and Vranken (2009; 2010). 
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Table 2. Land renting in the European Union 
 2000 2004 2013  Change 2013/2000 Change 2013/2004 
  % of UAA   % change  
Old Member States           
Belgium 75 75 73   -2.0 -2.1 
Denmark 25 29 30   18.8 2.8 
Germany 70 70 66   -5.6 -6.3 
Greece 36 42 52   44.4 24.4 
Spain 32 31 37   16.3 17.3 
France 81 84 88   8.7 4.0 
Ireland 18 19 19   3.7 1.6 
Italy 36 36 47   29.8 28.7 
Luxembourg 48 49 52   9.4 6.1 
Netherlands 39 41 40   2.6 -2.5 
Austria 26 30 28   5.0 -6.5 
Portugal 28 36 27   -2.0 -24.1 
Finland 32 34 35   7.9 1.6 
Sweden 40 48 54   35.2 11.0 
UK 39 40 43   8.2 5.6 
New Member States           
Bulgaria n.a n.a 87   n.a n.a 
Cyprus n.a 68 67   n.a -0.7 
Croatia n.a n.a 45   n.a n.a 
Czech R. n.a 91 81   n.a -10.8 
Estonia n.a 61 61   n.a 0.1 
Hungary n.a 66 62   n.a -5.2 
Latvia n.a 39 47   n.a 20.3 
Lithuania n.a 52 51   n.a -0.8 
Malta n.a 84 83   n.a -1.1 
Poland n.a 27 27   n.a 0.8 
Romania n.a n.a 55   n.a n.a 
Slovakia n.a 97 94   n.a -2.1 
Slovenia n.a 29 33   n.a 14.8 
       
EU 50 52 54  3.9 4.2 
Source: FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) 
Note: FADN is representative of the EU commercial agricultural holdings in term of number of holdings, but 
not in terms of area. 
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Table 3. Rental prices in the European Union (EUR/ha) 
  2000 2004 2013  Change 2013/2000 Change 2013/2004 
    EUR/ha     % change 
Old Member States           
Belgium 190 233 286   50.8 22.9 
Denmark 349 447 644   84.2 44.0 
Germany 206 216 265   28.9 22.9 
Greece 290 293 204   -29.6 -30.2 
Spain 92 109 118   29.0 8.1 
France 153 155 176   14.8 13.7 
Ireland 286 258 247   -13.6 -4.1 
Italy 167 199 189   12.9 -4.8 
Luxembourg 191 197 219   14.5 10.7 
Netherlands 706 776 974   37.8 25.5 
Austria 189 193 236   24.7 22.4 
Portugal 63 54 96   52.1 78.3 
Finland 149 169 216   44.6 27.7 
Sweden 166 141 219   32.0 55.2 
UK 179 163 139   -22.1 -14.7 
New Member States           
Bulgaria     178   n.a n.a 
Cyprus   164 178   n.a 8.4 
Czech R.   27 78   n.a 183.6 
Croatia n.a n.a 73   n.a n.a 
Estonia   5 30   n.a 446.7 
Hungary   54 122   n.a 126.1 
Lithuania   15 43   n.a 191.1 
Latvia   11 25   n.a 140.1 
Malta   106 112   n.a 5.6 
Poland   36 71   n.a 95.8 
Romania     91   n.a n.a 
Slovakia   24 47   n.a 96.7 
Slovenia   38 103   n.a 172.5 
Source: FADN 
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Table 4. SPS activated area in 2013 
  
SPS activated area   
(1000 ha) 
Ratio to eligible area  
(%) 
Old Member States     
Austria 2246 0.86 
Belgium 1136 0.81 
Germany 16533 0.99 
Denmark 2591 0.99 
Greece 3041 0.77 
Spain 17050 0.74 
Finland 2277 1.00 
France 25969 0.97 
Ireland 4198 0.89 
Italy 7337 0.74 
Luxembourg 118 0.95 
Netherlands 1353 0.77 
Portugal 2288 0.81 
Sweden 2936 0.99 
UK* 14838 0.95 
New Member States     
Malta 7 0.95 
Slovenia 413 0.93 
Source: SPS activated area  (European Commission,2015b) ; Eligible area used to calculate the ratio of activated area to 
eligible area: Statel/Edamis CATS and FSS data for 2013. If data were not available for a given year, the value from 
previous year was used or the average value of the previous and subsequent year. Notes: the table reports only the number 
of activated entitlements, which is different from the total allocated entitlements. Farmers may also hold additional 
entitlements, which they may not be able to use due to the unavailability of eligible land. The data on the amount of these 
unused entitlements are not available.  
 
  
 54 
 
Table 5. Empirical evidence of decoupled payment capitalization into land values 
Study 
Type of area CAP subsidy 
(Country) 
Percentage change in 
land sales price per 1 
percent increase in 
subsidies 
Share of subsidy 
capitalized into 
land rents (%) 
Michalek, Ciaian and Kancs (2014) SPS (EU, OMS)  6-10 
Kilian et al. (2012) SPS, hybrid (Germany, Bavaria)  44-94 
Feichtinger and Salhofer (2015a) SPS, hybrid (Germany, Bavaria)  35 
Klaiber, Salhofer and Thompson (2016) SPS, hybrid (Germany, Bavaria)  0.37-0.57 
Guastella et al. (2014) SPS, historical (Italy)  0 
O’Neill and Hanrahan (2016) SPS, historical (Ireland) 
 
Short-run: 7-25 
Long-run: 21-53 
    
Ciaian and Kancs (2012) SAPS (EU, NMS)  19 
Van Herck, Swinnen and Vranken (2013) SAPS (EU, NMS)  15-32 
    
Nilsson and Johansson (2013) SPS, hybrid (Sweden) 0.54  
Karlsson and Nilsson (2014) SPS, hybrid (Sweden) 0.00  
Feichtinger and Salhofer (2015b) SPS, hybrid (Germany, Bavaria) 0.20-0.28  
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Table 6. The CAP budget before and after the reform (million Euros and Index) 
  Decoupled payments  Total direct payments 
  
2013 2019 Index 2019/2013  2013 2019 
Index 
2019/2013 
Old Member States            
Austria 618 663 1.07   752 692 0.92 
Belgium 461 392 0.85   615 482 0.78 
Germany 5101 4745 0.93   5853 4793 0.82 
Denmark 883 778 0.88   1049 818 0.78 
Greece 1990 1651 0.83   2217 2022 0.91 
Spain 4405 4211 0.96   5319 4953 0.93 
Finland 469 423 0.90   571 525 0.92 
France 6765 6039 0.89   8521 7190 0.84 
Ireland 1206 1188 0.99   1341 1211 0.90 
Italy 3629 3260 0.90   4370 3702 0.85 
Luxembourg 33 33 0.99   37 33 0.90 
Netherlands 779 683 0.88   898 701 0.78 
Portugal 425 470 1.11   606 599 0.99 
Sweden 677 595 0.88   771 700 0.91 
UK 3171 3180 1.00   3898 3201 0.82 
New Member States             
Bulgaria 551 705 1.28   580 793 1.37 
Cyprus 52 44 0.86   54 49 0.91 
Croatia   262       316   
Czech R. 806 731 0.91   909 857 0.94 
Estonia 98 139 1.42   101 144 1.42 
Hungary 1115 1139 1.02   1319 1274 0.97 
Lithuania 351 430 1.23   380 517 1.36 
Latvia 136 239 1.76   147 280 1.91 
Malta 5.3 2.2 0.42   5.1 5.2 1.02 
Poland 2707 2898 1.07   3045 3430 1.13 
Romania 1211 1591 1.31   1265 1903 1.51 
Slovenia 132 113 0.86   144 134 0.93 
Slovakia 340 391 1.15   388 449 1.16 
                
EU-27 38115 36732 0.96  45153 41456 0.92 
EU-28 38115 36994 0.97   45153 41772 0.93 
Sources: Data for 2013 based on European Commission (2014) and data for 2019 based on European 
Commission (2015c) 
Notes: decoupled payments include BPS (SAPS), greening, redistributive payment and ANC (only in Denmark). 
Total direct payments include: decoupled payments, the young farmer scheme, the voluntary coupled support and the small 
farmer scheme.  
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Table 7. The implementation of decoupled payments by Member State  
  
  
Pre-reform 
implementation* 
2013 CAP reform 
Internal convergence  
Redistributive 
payment 
(max ha per farm; % 
of the budget) 
Method of entitlement 
allocation 
Old Member States    
Austria SPS historical National FR by 2019  New entitlements 
Belgium-Wallonia SPS historical PC Yes (30 ha; 17%) New entitlements 
Belgium-Flanders SPS historical PC  New entitlements
*** 
Germany SPS dynamic hybrid National FR in 2019 Yes (46 ha; 7%) New entitlements 
Denmark SPS static hybrid PC  Old entitlements 
Greece SPS historical Regional PC  New entitlements 
Spain SPS historical Regional PC  New entitlements
*** 
Finland SPS dynamic hybrid Regional FR by 2019  Old entitlements 
France SPS historical PC** Yes (52 ha; 20%) New entitlements 
Ireland SPS historical PC  New entitlements
*** 
Italy SPS historical PC  New entitlements 
Luxembourg SPS static hybrid PC  New entitlements 
Netherlands SPS historical National FR by 2019  New entitlements 
Portugal SPS historical PC  New entitlements
*** 
Sweden SPS static hybrid PC  Old entitlements 
UK- England SPS dynamic hybrid Regional FR in 2015  Old entitlements 
UK- Scotland SPS historical Regional FR by 2019  New entitlements 
UK- Wales  SPS historical National FR by 2019 Yes (54 ha; 3%) New entitlements 
UK- N. Ireland SPS static hybrid PC   
New Member States    
Bulgaria SAPS SAPS Yes (30 ha; 7%)  
Cyprus SAPS SAPS   
Czech R. SAPS SAPS   
Croatia - PC Yes (20 ha, 10%) New entitlements 
Estonia SAPS SAPS   
Hungary SAPS SAPS   
Lithuania SAPS SAPS Yes (30 ha; 15%)  
Latvia SAPS SAPS   
Malta SPS regional National FR in 2015  New entitlements 
Poland SAPS SAPS Yes (30; 8%)  
Romania SAPS SAPS Yes (30; 5%)  
Slovenia SPS regional PC  New entitlements 
Slovakia SAPS SAPS   
Notes: 
 
*
Those MS implementing the dynamic hybrid model gradually move to a fully regional model. In MS 
implementing the static hybrid model, the regional and the historical shares do not change over time;  
**
 Except for France-Corsica which applies flat-rate from 2015;  
***
 MS limits the allocated entitlements to the minimum between the eligible area in 2013 and the declared 
eligible area in 2015 
FR: flat rate; PC: partial convergence by 2019;  
Source: European Commission 2007a, 2013a, 2015, 2015c, 2016. 
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Table 8. Data used for the capitalization quantifications 
  
Entitlements (No. in 1000 and  %)**    
Eligible area  
(1000 ha) 
  
Average payment 
(tav) (Euro per 
entitlement or per ha)   
Marginal payment 
(tm) (Euro per 
entitlement or per ha)   
Marginal payment value by reform element  (Euro per entitlement or per ha) 
  2013 
Ratio to 
eligible area 
(%) 
2019 
Ratio to 
eligible area 
(%) 
  
2013 2019 
  
2013 2019   2013 2019   
Entitlement stock 
change (Ref. IV) 
Budget change 
(Ref. I) 
Internal 
convergence (Ref. 
II) 
Differentiation of 
payments (Ref. 
III) 
          Value Change Value Change Value Change Value Change 
Old Member States       
  
                                
Austria 2246 0.86 2226 0.78   2601 2862   275.2 298.0   29.7 298.0   30.0 0.3 32.2 2.2 298.0 265.8 298.0 0.0 
Belgium 1136 0.81 1406 1.00   1405 1405   405.7 278.7   122.1 112.5   98.6 -23.5 83.9 -14.7 127.5 43.6 112.5 -15.0 
Germany 16533 0.99 16861 1.00   16764 16863   308.6 281.4   308.6 261.5   302.5 -6.0 281.4 -21.1 281.4 0.0 261.5 -19.9 
Denmark 2591 0.99 2591 0.99   2608 2608   340.8 300.3   258.9 227.3   258.9 0.0 228.1 -30.8 227.3 -0.8 227.3 0.0 
Greece 3041 0.77 5110 1.18   3924 4333   654.5 323.2   64.3 85.9   38.2 -26.0 31.7 -6.5 85.9 54.2 85.9 0.0 
Spain 17050 0.74 21753 0.94   23181 23181   258.3 193.6   20.7 57.5   16.2 -4.5 15.5 -0.7 57.5 42.0 57.5 0.0 
Finland 2277 1.00 2277 1.00   2288 2288   205.9 185.7   141.9 185.7   141.9 0.0 128.0 -13.9 185.7 57.7 185.7 0.0 
France 25969 0.97 28480 1.01   26732 28184   260.5 212.1   50.8 79.7   46.3 -4.5 41.4 -5.0 104.6 63.2 79.7 -24.9 
Ireland 4198 0.89 4986 1.06   4712 4712   287.3 238.3   38.2 98.0   32.1 -6.0 31.7 -0.5 98.0 66.3 98.0 0.0 
Italy 7337 0.74 13132 1.00   9976 13134   494.7 248.2   66.9 85.8   37.4 -29.5 33.6 -3.8 85.8 52.3 85.8 0.0 
Luxembourg 118 0.95 131 1.00   123 131   281.2 249.9   84.7 114.4   75.9 -8.7 75.2 -0.7 114.4 39.1 114.4 0.0 
Netherlands 1353 0.77 1866 1.02   1750 1838   575.6 366.2   57.6 366.2   41.7 -15.8 36.6 -5.1 366.2 329.5 366.2 0.0 
Portugal 2288 0.81 2824 1.00   2824 2824   185.8 166.4   15.1 68.9   12.3 -2.9 13.6 1.3 68.9 55.3 68.9 0.0 
Sweden 2936 0.99 2936 0.99   2966 2966   230.4 202.6   108.1 117.5   108.1 0.0 95.1 -13.1 117.5 22.4 117.5 0.0 
UK* 14838 0.95 16622 0.99   15574 16752   213.7 191.3   213.7 186.4   190.8 -22.9 191.3 0.5 191.3 0.0 186.4 -4.9 
New Member States                                            
Bulgaria           3754 3754   146.8 187.7   146.8 172.8   146.8 0.0 187.7 40.9 187.7 0.0 172.8 -14.9 
Cyprus           127 127   405.7 347.6   405.7 347.6   405.7 0.0 347.6 -58.1 347.6 0.0 347.6 0.0 
Croatia     1302 1.00   900 1302   - 201.6   - 177.3   - - - - - - - - 
Czech R.           3528 3528   228.5 207.1   228.5 207.1   228.5 0.0 207.1 -21.4 207.1 0.0 207.1 0.0 
Estonia           925 966   101.3 143.6   101.3 143.6   101.3 0.0 143.6 42.3 143.6 0.0 143.6 0.0 
Hungary           5011 5340   208.8 213.3   208.8 213.3   208.8 0.0 213.3 4.5 213.3 0.0 213.3 0.0 
Lithuania           2760 2891   121.5 148.9   121.5 122.1   121.5 0.0 148.9 27.4 148.9 0.0 122.1 -26.8 
Latvia           1635 1868   72.6 127.8   72.6 127.8   72.6 0.0 127.8 55.2 127.8 0.0 127.8 0.0 
Malta 7 0.95 12 1.01   8 12   712.8 189.1   712.8 189.1   448.5 -264.2 189.1 -259.4 189.1 0.0 189.1 0.0 
Poland           14078 14410   187.8 201.1   187.8 181.3   187.8 0.0 201.1 13.3 201.1 0.0 181.3 -19.9 
Romania           9942 9942   121.8 160.0   121.8 149.8   121.8 0.0 160.0 38.2 160.0 0.0 149.8 -10.2 
Slovenia 413 0.93 479 1.00   444 479   319.3 235.5   319.3 132.6   275.1 -44.2 235.5 -39.6 132.6 -102.9 132.6 0.0 
Slovakia           1883 1883   180.3 207.4   180.3 207.4   180.3 0.0 207.4 27.1 207.4 0.0 207.4 0.0 
Source: Number of entitlements: European Commission (2015b); Eligible area in 2013: CATS-database data (DG-AGRI) and FSS; Eligible area in 2019: calculated based on CATS-database data 
(DG-AGRI) and FSS and eligible area in 2013 (by adding to 2013 eligible area the new eligible crops and deducting the crops not eligible in the relevant MS (e.g. greenhouses, vineyards); Number of 
entitlements for 2013: Table 4; Number of entitlements for 2019: calculated based on FADN data. Average payment value: calculated by dividing the total decoupled envelope from Table 6 by the 
number of entitlements for SPS or by the total eligible area for SAPS; Marginal payment values: see the data section in the paper. 
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Table 9. Expected impact of the 2013 CAP reform on decoupled payments capitalization 
  
Pre-reform capitalization rate (% of 1 Euro of 
DP) 
  
2013 CAP reform capitalization rate (% of 1 
Euro of DP) 
 
Central  Low High 
 
Central  Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) 
Old Member States               
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.31 0.27 0.37 
Germany 0.78 0.00 0.90   0.72 0.62 0.84 
Denmark 0.59 0.51 0.69   0.59 0.50 0.68 
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.21 0.18 0.24 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finland 0.54 0.46 0.62   0.78 0.67 0.90 
France 0.15 0.00 0.18   0.29 0.25 0.34 
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.32 0.27 0.37 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.27 0.23 0.31 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.27   0.36 0.31 0.41 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.32 0.28 0.37 
Sweden 0.36 0.31 0.42   0.45 0.39 0.52 
UK* 0.00 0.00 0.90   0.76 0.65 0.88 
New Member States               
Bulgaria 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.72 0.61 0.83 
Cyprus 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Croatia - - -   0.68 0.59 0.80 
Czech R. 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Estonia 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Hungary 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Lithuania 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.64 0.55 0.74 
Latvia 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Malta 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.78 0.67 0.90 
Poland 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.70 0.60 0.82 
Romania 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.73 0.62 0.85 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.44 0.38 0.51 
Slovakia 0.78 0.67 0.90   0.78 0.67 0.90 
                
NMS 0.76 0.65 0.89   0.72 0.62 0.84 
OMS 0.20 0.03 0.32   0.39 0.34 0.46 
EU 0.31 0.15 0.43   0.47 0.40 0.55 
Notes: * The SPS model as in UK-England was assumed for UK; Aggregated values for NMS, OMS and EU are weighted averages 
over MS using decoupled payments as weights. 
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Table 10. Sources of the 2013 CAP reform capitalization  
  
Pre-reform 
  
Entitlement stock change (Ref. 
IV) 
  
Budget change (Ref. I) 
  
Internal convergence (Ref. II) 
  
Differentiation of payments 
(Ref. III) 
Central  Low High Central  Low High Central  Low High Central  Low High Central  Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Old Member States                                       
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0   87.6 87.6 87.6   -13.1 -13.1 -13.1   38.8 38.8 38.8   -13.3 -13.3 -13.3 
Germany 118.0 0.0 118.0   -2.3 115.7 -2.3   -8.1 -8.1 -8.1   0.0 0.0 0.0   -7.6 -7.6 -7.6 
Denmark 113.9 113.9 113.9   0.0 0.0 0.0   -13.5 -13.5 -13.5   -0.4 -0.4 -0.4   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0   44.5 44.5 44.5   -7.6 -7.6 -7.6   63.1 63.1 63.1   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 76.4 76.4 76.4   0.0 0.0 0.0   -7.5 -7.5 -7.5   31.1 31.1 31.1   0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 63.8 0.0 63.8   -5.6 58.2 -5.6   -6.2 -6.2 -6.2   79.3 79.3 79.3   -31.2 -31.2 -31.2 
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0   32.8 32.8 32.8   -0.5 -0.5 -0.5   67.7 67.7 67.7   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 0.0 0.0 0.0   43.5 43.5 43.5   -4.4 -4.4 -4.4   60.9 60.9 60.9   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Luxembourg 0.0 0.0 74.0   66.4 66.4 -7.6   -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   34.2 34.2 34.2   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0   11.4 11.4 11.4   -1.4 -1.4 -1.4   90.0 90.0 90.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0   17.8 17.8 17.8   1.9 1.9 1.9   80.3 80.3 80.3   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sweden 92.0 92.0 92.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   -11.1 -11.1 -11.1   19.1 19.1 19.1   0.0 0.0 0.0 
UK* 0.0 0.0 114.6   102.3 102.3 -12.3   0.3 0.3 0.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 
New Member States                                       
Bulgaria 85.0 85.0 85.0   0.0 0.0 0.0   23.6 23.6 23.6   0.0 0.0 0.0   -8.6 -8.6 -8.6 
Cyprus 116.7 116.7 116.7   0.0 0.0 0.0   -16.7 -16.7 -16.7   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia - - -   - - -   - - -   - - -   - - - 
Czech R. 110.3 110.3 110.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   -10.3 -10.3 -10.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Estonia 70.5 70.5 70.5   0.0 0.0 0.0   29.5 29.5 29.5   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 97.9 97.9 97.9   0.0 0.0 0.0   2.1 2.1 2.1   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Lithuania 99.5 99.5 99.5   0.0 0.0 0.0   22.4 22.4 22.4   0.0 0.0 0.0   -22.0 -22.0 -22.0 
Latvia 56.8 56.8 56.8   0.0 0.0 0.0   43.2 43.2 43.2   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0   237.1 237.1 237.1   -137.1 -137.1 -137.1   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Poland 103.6 103.6 103.6   0.0 0.0 0.0   7.3 7.3 7.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   -11.0 -11.0 -11.0 
Romania 81.3 81.3 81.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   25.5 25.5 25.5   0.0 0.0 0.0   -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0   207.5 207.5 207.5   -29.8 -29.8 -29.8   -77.6 -77.6 -77.6   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Slovakia 86.9 86.9 86.9   0.0 0.0 0.0   13.1 13.1 13.1   0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
                                        
NMS 91.2 91.2 91.2   1.7 1.7 1.7   11.4 11.4 11.4   -0.6 -0.6 -0.6   -6.5 -6.5 -6.5 
OMS 55.9 9.2 80.9   28.4 75.1 3.4   -5.3 -5.3 -5.3   29.0 29.0 29.0   -8.1 -8.1 -8.1 
EU 68.7 38.9 84.6   18.8 48.6 2.8   0.7 0.7 0.7   18.3 18.3 18.3   -7.5 -7.5 -7.5 
Notes: * The SPS model as in UK-England was assumed for UK; Aggregated values for NMS, OMS and EU are weighted averages over MS using decoupled payments as w eights. 
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Table 11. Land renting, and non-farming land owners' gains from the decoupled payments 
  Share of rented 
farmland (2013) 
(%) 
Non-farming land owner gains (% of 1 Euro of DP) 
  
Pre-reform capitalization rate  
  
2013 CAP reform capitalization rate  
Central  Low High Central  Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Old Member States                 
Austria 27.6 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 73.2 0.0 0.0 0.0   23.0 19.7 26.7 
Germany 65.9 51.3 0.0 59.7   47.7 40.9 55.4 
Denmark 29.9 17.6 15.1 20.5   17.6 15.1 20.4 
Greece 52.2 0.0 0.0 0.0   10.8 9.3 12.6 
Spain 36.8 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 34.6 18.5 15.9 21.6   26.9 23.1 31.3 
France 87.8 13.3 0.0 15.5   25.7 22.0 29.9 
Ireland 18.9 0.0 0.0 0.0   6.0 5.2 7.0 
Italy 46.7 0.0 0.0 0.0   12.6 10.8 14.6 
Luxembourg 52.2 0.0 0.0 14.2   18.6 15.9 21.6 
Netherlands 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   31.1 26.7 36.2 
Portugal 27.2 0.0 0.0 0.0   8.8 7.5 10.2 
Sweden 53.7 19.6 16.8 22.8   24.2 20.8 28.2 
UK* 42.7 0.0 0.0 38.6   32.4 27.7 37.6 
New Member States                 
Bulgaria 87.3 67.9 58.2 78.9   62.5 53.6 72.7 
Cyprus 67.2 52.3 44.8 60.8   52.3 44.8 60.8 
Croatia 45.0 - - -   30.8 26.4 35.8 
Czech R. 80.9 62.9 53.9 73.2   62.9 53.9 73.2 
Estonia 60.9 47.4 40.6 55.1   47.4 40.6 55.1 
Hungary 62.2 48.3 41.4 56.2   48.3 41.4 56.2 
Lithuania 51.5 40.0 34.3 46.6   32.8 28.1 38.2 
Latvia 47.2 36.7 31.5 42.7   36.7 31.5 42.7 
Malta 82.9 0.0 0.0 0.0   64.5 55.3 75.0 
Poland 26.8 20.9 17.9 24.3   18.8 16.1 21.9 
Romania 55.1 42.8 36.7 49.8   40.1 34.4 46.6 
Slovenia 33.5 0.0 0.0 0.0   14.7 12.6 17.1 
Slovakia 94.5 73.5 63.0 85.5   73.5 63.0 85.5 
                  
NMS 53.5 40.8 35.0 47.5   38.7 33.2 45.0 
OMS 54.3 10.7 1.6 17.5   21.2 18.2 24.7 
EU 53.8 16.6 8.2 23.3   25.2 21.6 29.3 
Source: Own calculations based on the capitalization rates are constructed using estimates from Table 9 (columns 2 to 7) and land 
renting form FADN data for 2013.  
Notes: * The SPS model as in UK-England was assumed for UK; Aggregated values for NMS, OMS and EU are weighted 
averages over MS using decoupled payments as weights. 
 
 61 
 
Appendix 1: Derivation of the capitalization effects of decoupled payments  
 
Following Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2014) the market equilibrium without SPS can be defined as 
follows: 
(3) ( ) ( )D r S r  
The market equilibrium changes as follows for SAPS or for SPS if entitlements are in surplus: 
(4) ( ) ( )D r t S r      for SAPS or for SPS if AT ≥ A* 
Decoupled payments affect the market equilibrium if SPS entitlements, AE
T
, are in surplus (if A
*
 ≤ 
AE
T
) or in the case of SAPS because all land is eligible for payments, AE
T
 = A. This is shown for 
region 1 in Figure 2. However, if SPS entailments are in deficit than the decoupled subsidies do not 
affect the market equilibrium. This is shown for region 2 in Figure 2. 
Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (4) yields: 
(5) 
m
D D S
r t r
r r r
 
where tm is marginal value of decoupled payment. Converting the equation (5) in elasticity form 
yields: 
(6) 
m
S r D r D r
r t
r D r D r D
 
(7) 
D
S D
m
r
K
t
    for SAPS or for SPS if A
T
 ≥ A* 
where S  and 
D  are the land supply and land demand elasticities, respectively, with 
  S S r r S     and   D D r r D     and K is the capitalization parameter which determines 
how much one Euro of decoupled payments is capitalised in land rental prices, ( )D S DK . 
Equation (7) shows the marginal capitalization rate of the decoupled payments for SAPS 
and for SPS if entitlements are in surplus. The marginal capitalization rate decreases with land 
supply elasticity and increases with land demand elasticity. For example, in an extreme situation 
with fully inelastic land supply, 0S  , the marginal decoupled payments are fully capitalised in 
land rents, i.e. 1mr t   . Note that to derive the capitalization rate with equation (7) one needs to 
consider marginal value of decoupled payments if decoupled payments vary across farms. For 
example for the historical model shown in Figure 3, the marginal entitlement value is equal to t
2
, tm 
= t
2
, whereas for the flat-rate SPS model shown in Figure 3, the marginal entitlement value is equal 
to the average payment value t
r
, tm = t
r
. Similar to regional SPS model, for SAPS the marginal 
entitlement value is equal to the average payment value. 
Reorganizing the equation (7) and dividing it by the average value of decoupled payment, 
tav, one obtains the average capitalization rate  
(8) m
av av
tr
K
t t
 
 62 
 
For the decoupled payment with homogenous payments between farms (e.g. SAPS or the flat-rate 
SPS model) tm = tav, while for payments where they differ between farms (e.g. historical SPS 
model) tm < tav.  
 Equations (8) indicates how much (% share) of one Euro of decoupled payments is reflected 
in higher rental prices. We use equations (8) to calculate the pre-reform capitalization rate which is 
defined as follows 
(9) m
av avO
tr
K
t t
     for SAPS or for SPS if A
T
 ≥ A* 
Next we derive the capitalization effect of the 2013 CAP reform. Assuming a given pre-
reform decoupled subsidy system, and totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (4) with 
respect to all reform elements yields: 
(10) 
I II III IV
m m m m
av av av av avN
t t t tr
K
t t t t t
  for SAPS or for SPS if A
T
 ≥ A* 
where Δtm
I
, Δtm
II
, Δtm
III
 and Δtm
IV
 are changes in marginal value of decoupled payments due to the 
first, the second, the third and the fourth reform element, respectively. The equation (10) 
decomposes the contribution of the individual reform elements in the total change in the average 
capitalization rate.  
 Adding the pre-reform capitalization rate (9) to both sides of equation (10) and converting it 
to relive shares yields 
(11) 1 O I II III IVsh sh sh sh sh  
where sh
i
 is the relative contribution (% share) of the reform element i to the total average 
capitalization rate of the 2013 CAP reform, for i = I, II, III, IV, with i I
m av av N
sh K t t r t , and 
sh
O
 is the relative contribution of the pre-reform capitalization to the total average capitalization 
rate of the 2013 CAP reform with O
av avO N
sh r t r t . The sum over all five shares on the 
right hand side of equation (11) equals one (or 100%).  
 Equation (11) provides the contribution of each reform element alongside the pre-reform 
capitalization in the total average capitalization rate of the 2013 CAP reform. It gives information 
on the relative importance of the reform in affecting the capitalization of decoupled payments 
compared to the pre-reform capitalization rate.    
Note that, the SPS capitalization rate for the case when entitlements are in deficit is zero: 
0avr t   . This follows form the conceptual model illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The SPS 
has a zero-distortive marginal effect on farm rental decisions when there are insufficient 
entitlements relative to eligible area. This result is not affected by the SPS model applied in the pre-
reform period (e.g. by historical, hybrid or regional model) or by the four studied reform elements 
as long as the stock of entitlements remain in deficit relative to the eligible area. 
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Appendix 2: Derivation of land demand elasticity 
 
Empirical studies estimating land demand elasticises are scarce. For this reason we derive the land 
demand elasticity using cost minimization problem assuming Cob Douglass production function. 
Then we extract production function parameters from literature to calculate the land demand 
elasticity based on derived formula. The estimates on production function parameters are more 
widely available in the literature and thus it is easier to obtain the land demand elasticity using this 
indirect approach. 
We consider cost minimization problem where representative farm minimizes the sum of 
land and non-land costs for a given production quantity, Q: 
(12) Min rA wL  
(13) 1Q BA L  
where w is price of non-land input, L is quantity of non-land input, B is production function 
parameter and α and 1- α are production function elasticises with respect to land and non-land input, 
respectively. Consistent with usual assumption and commonly found empirical evidence in the 
literature, we assume constant return to scale production function (Petrick and Kloss 2013). 
Defining Lagrange function, deriving FOC conditions and then solving for land demand elasticity, 
    ( )D dA dr r A dD dr r D   , yields 
(14) (1 )D  
The estimates of Mundlak et al. (2012) for 30 developing and developed countries, Ciaian and 
Kancs (2011) for eight NMS and Petrick and Kloss (2013) for eight EU countries show that the 
production function elasticity of land varies between -0.15 and 0.54. The estimates of Petrick and 
Kloss (2013) suggest that the elasticity is lower for the EU than for non-EU countries. Based on the 
results of Ciaian and Kancs (2011) and Petrick and Kloss (2013) we consider the variation of the 
land production elasticity between 0.05 and 0.2. This implies the land demand elasticity derived 
from equation (14) is in the interval between -0.95 and -0.8. 
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